Banzai International (PARA)
Market Price (10/26/2026): $0.6081 | Market Cap: $-Sector: Information Technology | Industry: Application Software
Banzai International (PARA)
Market Price (10/26/2026): $0.6081Market Cap: $-Sector: Information TechnologyIndustry: Application Software
Investment Highlights Why It Matters Detailed financial logic regarding cash flow yields vs trend-riding momentum.
Weak multi-year price returns2Y Excs Rtn is -130%, 3Y Excs Rtn is -177% | Penny stockMkt Price is 0.4 Not profitable at operating income levelOp Inc LTMOperating Income, Last Twelve Months is -19 Mil, Op Mgn LTMOperating Margin = Operating Income / Revenue Reflects profitability before taxes and before impact of capital structure (interest payments). is -178% Weak revenue growthRev Chg QQuarterly Revenue Change % is -27% Significant share based compensationSBC/Rev LTMShare Based Compensation / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is 38% Not cash flow generativeCFO/Rev LTMCash Flow from Operations / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -151%, FCF/Rev LTMFree Cash Flow / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -151% High stock price volatilityVol 12M is 148% Significant short interestShort Interest % of Basic SharesShort Interest % of Basic Shares = (Short Interest Quantity) / (Basic Shares Outstanding). A high fraction of short interest can indicate potential risk of a short squeeze. is 36% Key risksPARA key risks include [1] a massive debt burden and significant integration challenges from its Warner Bros. Show more. |
| Weak multi-year price returns2Y Excs Rtn is -130%, 3Y Excs Rtn is -177% |
| Penny stockMkt Price is 0.4 |
| Not profitable at operating income levelOp Inc LTMOperating Income, Last Twelve Months is -19 Mil, Op Mgn LTMOperating Margin = Operating Income / Revenue Reflects profitability before taxes and before impact of capital structure (interest payments). is -178% |
| Weak revenue growthRev Chg QQuarterly Revenue Change % is -27% |
| Significant share based compensationSBC/Rev LTMShare Based Compensation / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is 38% |
| Not cash flow generativeCFO/Rev LTMCash Flow from Operations / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -151%, FCF/Rev LTMFree Cash Flow / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -151% |
| High stock price volatilityVol 12M is 148% |
| Significant short interestShort Interest % of Basic SharesShort Interest % of Basic Shares = (Short Interest Quantity) / (Basic Shares Outstanding). A high fraction of short interest can indicate potential risk of a short squeeze. is 36% |
| Key risksPARA key risks include [1] a massive debt burden and significant integration challenges from its Warner Bros. Show more. |
Qualitative Assessment
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Banzai International (PARA) stock has lost about 85% since 6/30/2026 because of the following key factors:
1. Substantial Financial Underperformance in Fiscal Q2 2026. Banzai International, Inc. (PARA) reported its fiscal Q2 2026 earnings on August 14, 2026, revealing continued weak financial results. Total revenue for the six months ended June 30, 2026, improved by only $0.2 million from fiscal Q1 2026, indicating very low revenue generation in the April-June period. This underperformance, following a significant miss in fiscal Q1 2026 where the company posted an earnings per share (EPS) of -$11.69 against expectations of -$5.00 (a 133.80% miss), and quarterly revenue of $2.7 million below estimates, contributed to a sustained negative market sentiment within the specified period.
2. Dramatic Deterioration in Analyst Sentiment and Price Target Revisions. Following consistent financial underperformance, the analyst outlook for Banzai International significantly deteriorated. By early August 2026, the consensus price target was sharply reduced from $480 to $42.00. This severe downgrade from financial analysts signaled a profound loss of confidence in the company's future prospects and valuation, exerting substantial downward pressure on the stock price throughout the period.
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Banzai International (PARA) stock has lost about 85% since 6/30/2026 because of the following key factors:
1. Substantial Financial Underperformance in Fiscal Q2 2026. Banzai International, Inc. (PARA) reported its fiscal Q2 2026 earnings on August 14, 2026, revealing continued weak financial results. Total revenue for the six months ended June 30, 2026, improved by only $0.2 million from fiscal Q1 2026, indicating very low revenue generation in the April-June period. This underperformance, following a significant miss in fiscal Q1 2026 where the company posted an earnings per share (EPS) of -$11.69 against expectations of -$5.00 (a 133.80% miss), and quarterly revenue of $2.7 million below estimates, contributed to a sustained negative market sentiment within the specified period.
2. Dramatic Deterioration in Analyst Sentiment and Price Target Revisions. Following consistent financial underperformance, the analyst outlook for Banzai International significantly deteriorated. By early August 2026, the consensus price target was sharply reduced from $480 to $42.00. This severe downgrade from financial analysts signaled a profound loss of confidence in the company's future prospects and valuation, exerting substantial downward pressure on the stock price throughout the period.
3. Extreme Stock Price Depreciation from 52-Week High. As of October 23, 2026, Banzai International (PARA) was trading at approximately $0.425. This compares to its 52-week high of $46.600. This enormous disparity highlights an acute and prolonged loss of market value, which is consistent with the reported 85% decline since June 30, 2026. The stock's inability to maintain previous valuation levels suggests a fundamental shift in investor perception and market confidence, leading to sustained selling pressure.
4. Micro-Capitalization Status and Heightened Volatility. Banzai International's market capitalization, up to $300 million, places PARA in the micro-capitalization category. Stocks with such small market caps are typically more susceptible to significant price fluctuations due to lower trading volumes, reduced institutional interest, and greater sensitivity to negative news or changes in investor sentiment. This inherent volatility likely amplified the downward trend during a period of financial distress and analyst downgrades.
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Stock Movement Drivers
Fundamental Drivers
The -85.9% change in PARA stock from 6/30/2026 to 10/24/2026 was primarily driven by a -65.6% change in the company's P/S Multiple.| (LTM values as of) | 6302026 | 10242026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Price ($) | 3.02 | 0.43 | -85.9% |
| Change Contribution By: | |||
| Total Revenues ($ Mil) | 11 | 11 | -7.4% |
| P/S Multiple | 0.2 | 0.1 | -65.6% |
| Shares Outstanding (Mil) | 1 | 2 | -55.7% |
| Cumulative Contribution | -85.9% |
Market Drivers
6/30/2026 to 10/24/2026| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| PARA | -85.9% | |
| Market (SPY) | 1.8% | 20.5% |
| Sector (XLK) | -3.8% | 17.0% |
Fundamental Drivers
The -97.8% change in PARA stock from 3/31/2026 to 10/24/2026 was primarily driven by a -92.1% change in the company's P/S Multiple.| (LTM values as of) | 3312026 | 10242026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Price ($) | 19.02 | 0.43 | -97.8% |
| Change Contribution By: | |||
| Total Revenues ($ Mil) | 12 | 11 | -12.6% |
| P/S Multiple | 0.8 | 0.1 | -92.1% |
| Shares Outstanding (Mil) | 1 | 2 | -67.6% |
| Cumulative Contribution | -97.8% |
Market Drivers
3/31/2026 to 10/24/2026| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| PARA | -97.8% | |
| Market (SPY) | 17.2% | 10.9% |
| Sector (XLK) | 38.0% | 13.7% |
Fundamental Drivers
The -99.3% change in PARA stock from 9/30/2025 to 10/24/2026 was primarily driven by a -94.1% change in the company's Shares Outstanding (Mil).| (LTM values as of) | 9302025 | 10242026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Price ($) | 58.80 | 0.43 | -99.3% |
| Change Contribution By: | |||
| Total Revenues ($ Mil) | 9 | 11 | 19.6% |
| P/S Multiple | 0.6 | 0.1 | -89.8% |
| Shares Outstanding (Mil) | 0 | 2 | -94.1% |
| Cumulative Contribution | -99.3% |
Market Drivers
9/30/2025 to 10/24/2026| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| PARA | -99.3% | |
| Market (SPY) | 15.0% | 8.9% |
| Sector (XLK) | 30.5% | 11.7% |
Fundamental Drivers
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Market Drivers
9/30/2023 to 10/24/2026| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| PARA | -100.0% | |
| Market (SPY) | 83.9% | 7.6% |
| Sector (XLK) | 127.5% | 8.4% |
Price Returns Compared
| 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Total [1] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Returns | |||||||
| PARA Return | -4% | 4% | -81% | -98% | -94% | -98% | -100% |
| Peers Return | -0% | -58% | 56% | 8% | -19% | 25% | -28% |
| S&P 500 Return | 27% | -19% | 24% | 23% | 16% | 12% | 104% |
Monthly Win Rates [3] | |||||||
| PARA Win Rate | 45% | 83% | 83% | 17% | 17% | 10% | |
| Peers Win Rate | 50% | 28% | 55% | 53% | 43% | 54% | |
| S&P 500 Win Rate | 75% | 42% | 67% | 75% | 67% | 50% | |
Max Drawdowns [4] | |||||||
| PARA Max Drawdown | - | -1% | -83% | -99% | -96% | -99% | |
| Peers Max Drawdown | -37% | -62% | -28% | -30% | -39% | -40% | |
| S&P 500 Max Drawdown | -5% | -25% | -10% | -8% | -19% | -9% | |
[1] Cumulative total returns since the beginning of 2021
[2] Peers: HUBS, CRM, ADBE, ZM, RNG. See PARA Returns vs. Peers.
[3] Win Rate = % of calendar months in which monthly returns were positive
[4] Max drawdown represents maximum peak-to-trough decline within a year
[5] 2026 data is for the year up to 10/23/2026 (YTD)
How Low Can It Go
| Event | PARA | S&P 500 |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 Yen Carry Trade Unwind | ||
| % Loss | -36.8% | -7.8% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 58.2% | 8.5% |
| Time to Breakeven | 50 days | 18 days |
In The Past
Banzai International's stock fell -36.8% during the 2024 Yen Carry Trade Unwind. Such a loss loss requires a 58.2% gain to breakeven.
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| Event | PARA | S&P 500 |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 Yen Carry Trade Unwind | ||
| % Loss | -36.8% | -7.8% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 58.2% | 8.5% |
| Time to Breakeven | 50 days | 18 days |
In The Past
Banzai International's stock fell -36.8% during the 2024 Yen Carry Trade Unwind. Such a loss loss requires a 58.2% gain to breakeven.
Preserve Wealth
Limiting losses and compounding gains is essential to preserving wealth.
Asset Allocation
Actively managed asset allocation strategies protect wealth. Learn more.
About Banzai International (PARA)
Paramount Global (PARA) is a comprehensive global media and entertainment company. It specializes in the creation, acquisition, and distribution of a wide array of content across numerous platforms to a worldwide audience. The company operates the well-known CBS Television Network and owns 29 local broadcast television stations, providing extensive news, public affairs, sports, and entertainment programming.
Its core offerings encompass a vast range of content, including primetime comedies and dramas, reality shows, daytime dramas, game shows, and kids' programs, distributed through its broadcast and cable networks, such as the 24-hour CBS Sports Network. A significant focus is on its digital strategy, highlighted by Paramount+, its flagship digital subscription video-on-demand and live streaming service that delivers a broad library of original and acquired content.
Beyond traditional television and streaming, Paramount Global is also a key player in the film industry, involved in the development, production, financing, acquisition, and distribution of movies. Its primary customers include global consumers who engage with its content via broadcast television, cable subscriptions, streaming services, and cinemas, as well as advertisers leveraging its extensive media reach.
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Here are 1-3 brief analogies for Paramount Global (PARA):
- Like Warner Bros. Discovery, with its own film studio, TV networks, and streaming service.
- Essentially Netflix, but also owns a major film studio (Paramount Pictures) and traditional broadcast networks like CBS.
- A smaller Disney, focused purely on content production, television networks, and streaming, without the theme parks.
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- News and Public Affairs Broadcasts: The company distributes a schedule of news and public affairs content across various platforms.
- Sports Programming: This includes acquiring, scheduling, and broadcasting sports content, notably through the 24-hour CBS Sports Network.
- Entertainment Programming: The company acquires, develops, and schedules a wide range of entertainment content for the CBS Television Network, including primetime comedies, dramas, reality, and late-night programs.
- Broadcast Television Station Operation: Paramount Global owns and operates 29 broadcast television stations.
- Paramount+ Streaming Service: This is a digital subscription video on-demand and live streaming service offering a vast library of content.
- Cable Network Programming: The company creates and acquires programming for distribution and viewing on its subscription, premium, and basic cable networks.
- Film Production and Distribution: Paramount Global develops, produces, finances, acquires, and distributes films globally.
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Paramount Global (PARA), the company described in the BACKGROUND section, serves a diverse customer base, with a significant portion of its revenue derived from other companies. Its major customers primarily fall into the following categories:
-
Multichannel Video Programming Distributors (MVPDs): These are cable, satellite, and virtual television providers that pay Paramount Global affiliate fees for the right to distribute its portfolio of linear television networks (e.g., CBS Television Network, Showtime, MTV, Comedy Central, Nickelodeon, Paramount Network) to their subscribers.
Examples of such customer companies include:
- Comcast (CMCSA)
- Charter Communications (CHTR)
- DISH Network (DISH)
- Google (GOOGL) (for YouTube TV)
-
Advertisers and Advertising Agencies: These are businesses and their representatives that purchase advertising inventory across Paramount Global's linear television channels, streaming services (e.g., Pluto TV, the ad-supported tiers of Paramount+), and digital platforms. While individual advertisers are numerous and diverse, the aggregated spending from these companies represents a substantial portion of Paramount Global's revenue.
-
Content Licensing Partners: Other media companies, streaming platforms, and international broadcasters that license films and television series produced or owned by Paramount Global for distribution on their own platforms.
Examples of such customer companies include:
- Netflix (NFLX)
- Amazon (AMZN) (for Prime Video)
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- Massive Debt Burden and Integration Risk from Warner Bros. Discovery Merger: Paramount Global's recent acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery has substantially increased its debt, projected to reach approximately $79 billion for the combined entity. This has led to credit rating downgrades to "junk" status by major agencies due to elevated leverage. The company faces significant challenges in managing this debt, particularly if interest rates remain high or if profitability declines. Additionally, integrating a massive entity like Warner Bros. Discovery, which itself carried substantial debt and underwent extensive cost-cutting, presents considerable operational and cultural integration risks. The merger also faces ongoing regulatory scrutiny, and delays could incur significant termination fees.
- Decline of Linear Television and Intense Streaming Competition: The media industry is undergoing a significant transformation with the accelerated decline of traditional linear television due to "cord-cutting." This trend directly impacts Paramount's revenue and margins from affiliate fees. While the company is focusing on its streaming service, Paramount+, it faces intense competition from larger, well-established rivals like Netflix, Disney+, Apple, and Amazon, which possess greater scale, deeper cash reserves, and more entrenched consumer habits. Despite some growth in its streaming segment, Paramount+ still lags behind leading competitors in subscriber base and daily usage, requiring it to rapidly increase digital ad revenue to offset linear declines.
- Overall Financial Flexibility and Profitability Concerns: Paramount Global has experienced periods of declining EBITDA and negative free cash flow in previous years, highlighting concerns about its financial flexibility. While recent results show a return to profitability for the streaming segment and overall net income, financial health indicators such as a low Piotroski F-score and Altman Z-score suggest potential underlying issues, including declining return on assets and liquidity challenges. The substantial debt from the Warner Bros. Discovery merger further strains the company's financial flexibility, potentially limiting its ability to invest in R&D and content, and leaving minimal room for strategic missteps.
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Emerging Threats for Paramount Global (PARA)
- Accelerating Decline of Linear Television and Cable Subscriptions: While cord-cutting has been an ongoing trend, its accelerating pace poses an intensifying threat to Paramount Global's substantial revenue derived from broadcast television stations and cable networks (e.g., CBS Sports Network). The continuous migration of advertising dollars and subscriber fees from traditional linear TV to diverse digital platforms creates immense pressure on Paramount's long-standing business model, paralleling the historical threat YouTube posed to cable companies but with increasing severity as the ecosystem shifts.
- Intensified Streaming Content Arms Race and Subscriber Churn: The highly competitive global streaming market, where Paramount+ vies against giants like Netflix, Disney+, and Max, necessitates massive and often unprofitable investment in content to attract and retain subscribers. As the streaming market matures and global subscriber growth slows, a clear emerging threat is the increasing difficulty of achieving sustainable profitability for Paramount+ amidst escalating content acquisition and production costs, coupled with rising consumer churn where subscribers frequently switch between services based on content releases or promotional offers. This scenario echoes Netflix's disruptive impact on Blockbuster, but now applied to established media companies navigating the complexities of their own streaming pivots.
- Fragmentation of Audience Attention by Short-Form and User-Generated Content (UGC): The exponential growth and dominant engagement of platforms like TikTok, YouTube Shorts, and Instagram Reels represent an emerging threat by capturing significant audience attention and advertising revenue, particularly among younger demographics. While these platforms do not directly replace long-form professional content, they fundamentally fragment the overall attention economy, making it increasingly challenging for Paramount Global to consistently attract, retain, and monetize viewers across its traditional broadcast, cable, and streaming properties. This competition for precious screen time and ad spend is a growing concern for legacy media.
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Peer Outperformance in Application Software
| Industry | Names | 1Y med | 3Y med | 5Y med | Top 3 by 5Y |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electronic Manufacturing Services | 10 | 22.7% | 137.2% | 207.2% | TTMI 496% · FLEX 458% · JBL 351% |
| Technology Distributors | 9 | 43.0% | 90.9% | 87.5% | AVT 163% · SNX 151% · CNXN 116% |
| Communications Equipment | 36 | 1.0% | 115.3% | 72.7% | AAOI 800% · LITE 800% · ANET 606% |
| Semiconductor Materials & Equipment | 28 | 43.5% | 70.4% | 63.1% | AXTI 510% · KLAC 346% · LRCX 335% |
| Electronic Components | 26 | -3.4% | 71.3% | 38.8% | CLS 2684% · BELFA 1101% · APH 291% |
| Semiconductors | 54 | 1.9% | 41.8% | 24.4% | MU 1231% · NVDA 832% · AVGO 582% |
| Technology Hardware, Storage & Peripherals | 21 | 13.2% | 83.6% | 21.4% | SMCI 833% · DELL 772% · STX 733% |
| Electronic Equipment & Instruments | 27 | -12.6% | 25.2% | -7.0% | PI 204% · OSIS 108% · KEYS 79% |
| Internet Services & Infrastructure | 6 | 4.6% | 51.4% | -7.1% | GDDY 63% · VRSN 40% · DOCN -1% |
| IT Consulting & Other Services | 29 | -22.5% | 4.4% | -22.1% | CHRN 388584% · APLD 297% · IBM 150% |
| Application Software ← | 126 | -19.7% | -4.2% | -44.2% | PLTR 705% · FROG 185% · AGYS 133% |
| Systems Software | 69 | -14.3% | 42.6% | -49.7% | ZETA 315% · CRWD 264% · FTNT 168% |
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Peer Comparisons
| Peers to compare with: |
Financials
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| Mkt Price | 172.17 |
| Mkt Cap | 28.1 |
| Rev LTM | 4,221 |
| Op Inc LTM | 679 |
| FCF LTM | 1,292 |
| FCF 3Y Avg | 1,165 |
| CFO LTM | 1,428 |
| CFO 3Y Avg | 1,295 |
Growth & Margins
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| Rev Chg LTM | 11.6% |
| Rev Chg 3Y Avg | 9.9% |
| Rev Chg Q | 8.4% |
| QoQ Delta Rev Chg LTM | 2.0% |
| Op Inc Chg LTM | 17.4% |
| Op Inc Chg 3Y Avg | 112.4% |
| Op Mgn LTM | 14.1% |
| Op Mgn 3Y Avg | 10.8% |
| QoQ Delta Op Mgn LTM | -0.4% |
| CFO/Rev LTM | 30.9% |
| CFO/Rev 3Y Avg | 28.4% |
| FCF/Rev LTM | 28.4% |
| FCF/Rev 3Y Avg | 25.8% |
Valuation
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| Mkt Cap | 28.1 |
| P/S | 4.0 |
| P/Op Inc | 23.7 |
| P/EBIT | 23.7 |
| P/E | 21.1 |
| P/CFO | 12.9 |
| Total Yield | 5.5% |
| Dividend Yield | 0.0% |
| FCF Yield 3Y Avg | 6.8% |
| D/E | 0.1 |
| Net D/E | 0.0 |
Returns
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| 1M Rtn | 5.4% |
| 3M Rtn | 24.5% |
| 6M Rtn | 14.3% |
| 12M Rtn | -13.6% |
| 3Y Rtn | -2.9% |
| 1M Excs Rtn | 6.5% |
| 3M Excs Rtn | 13.2% |
| 6M Excs Rtn | 7.9% |
| 12M Excs Rtn | -27.8% |
| 3Y Excs Rtn | -84.5% |
Comparison Analyses
Price Behavior
| Market Price | $0.43 | |
| First Trading Date | 12/29/2006 | |
| Distance from 52W High | -99.1% | |
| 50 Days | 200 Days | |
| DMA Price | $0.89 | $9.36 |
| DMA Trend | down | down |
| Distance from DMA | -52.4% | -95.5% |
| 3M | 1YR | |
| Volatility | 98.0% | 148.0% |
| Downside Capture | 727.28 | 498.97 |
| Upside Capture | -232.50 | -134.97 |
| Correlation (S&P 500) | 17.8% | 7.3% |
| 1M | 2M | 3M | 6M | 1Y | 3Y | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Beta | -0.59 | 0.87 | 2.17 | 1.44 | 1.01 | 0.84 |
| Up Beta | 5.01 | 0.84 | 1.30 | 2.74 | 0.87 | 1.00 |
| Down Beta | -5.09 | -1.49 | 1.44 | -4.56 | -2.06 | -0.17 |
| Up Capture | -303% | -187% | -80% | -82% | -32% | -7% |
| Bmk +ve Days | 6 | 16 | 27 | 66 | 132 | 424 |
| Stock +ve Days | 6 | 13 | 22 | 45 | 95 | 270 |
| Down Capture | 451% | 577% | 495% | 355% | 192% | 113% |
| Bmk -ve Days | 16 | 26 | 37 | 60 | 120 | 328 |
| Stock -ve Days | 14 | 26 | 37 | 76 | 148 | 439 |
[1] Upside and downside betas calculated using positive and negative benchmark daily returns respectively
Based On 1-Year Data
| Annualized Return | Annualized Volatility | Sharpe Ratio | Correlation with PARA | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PARA | -99.2% | 148.0% | -2.48 | - |
| Sector ETF (XLK) | 29.0% | 26.7% | 0.92 | 11.2% |
| Equity (SPY) | 14.8% | 12.7% | 0.80 | 7.6% |
| Gold (GLD) | -2.8% | 28.5% | -0.11 | 7.6% |
| Commodities (DBC) | 52.1% | 20.7% | 1.91 | 5.9% |
| Real Estate (VNQ) | 4.3% | 13.9% | 0.06 | -11.0% |
| Bitcoin (BTCUSD) | -24.8% | 43.5% | -0.54 | 15.4% |
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Based On 5-Year Data
| Annualized Return | Annualized Volatility | Sharpe Ratio | Correlation with PARA | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PARA | -91.6% | 132.8% | -1.29 | - |
| Sector ETF (XLK) | 19.5% | 26.0% | 0.67 | 6.3% |
| Equity (SPY) | 12.7% | 17.1% | 0.56 | 5.2% |
| Gold (GLD) | 17.3% | 18.9% | 0.73 | 5.0% |
| Commodities (DBC) | 9.5% | 19.5% | 0.37 | 2.3% |
| Real Estate (VNQ) | 1.1% | 18.9% | -0.05 | -0.7% |
| Bitcoin (BTCUSD) | 5.7% | 51.7% | 0.29 | 4.3% |
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Based On 10-Year Data
| Annualized Return | Annualized Volatility | Sharpe Ratio | Correlation with PARA | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PARA | -71.0% | 124.7% | -1.22 | - |
| Sector ETF (XLK) | 24.0% | 25.1% | 0.87 | 6.1% |
| Equity (SPY) | 15.3% | 17.9% | 0.72 | 5.1% |
| Gold (GLD) | 11.8% | 16.4% | 0.59 | 4.8% |
| Commodities (DBC) | 8.4% | 18.1% | 0.38 | 2.3% |
| Real Estate (VNQ) | 5.2% | 20.7% | 0.21 | -0.6% |
| Bitcoin (BTCUSD) | 62.4% | 66.2% | 1.02 | 3.9% |
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Returns Analyses
Earnings Returns History
Updated 10/21/2026| Forward Returns | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Date | 1D Returns | 5D Returns | 21D Returns |
| 4/15/2025 | -13.1% | -18.0% | -19.7% |
| 11/19/2024 | -9.4% | -23.5% | -4.7% |
| 5/16/2024 | -0.6% | -27.7% | -45.9% |
| 2/20/2024 | -23.6% | -40.9% | -51.5% |
| SUMMARY STATS | |||
| # Positive | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| # Negative | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Median Positive | |||
| Median Negative | -11.3% | -25.6% | -32.8% |
| Max Positive | |||
| Max Negative | -23.6% | -40.9% | -51.5% |
| Forward Returns | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Date | 1D Returns | 5D Returns | 21D Returns |
| 4/15/2025 | -13.1% | -18.0% | -19.7% |
| 11/19/2024 | -9.4% | -23.5% | -4.7% |
| 5/16/2024 | -0.6% | -27.7% | -45.9% |
| 2/20/2024 | -23.6% | -40.9% | -51.5% |
| SUMMARY STATS | |||
| # Positive | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| # Negative | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Median Positive | |||
| Median Negative | -11.3% | -25.6% | -32.8% |
| Max Positive | |||
| Max Negative | -23.6% | -40.9% | -51.5% |
SEC Filings
Expand for More| Report Date | Filing Date | Filing |
|---|---|---|
| 06/30/2026 | 08/14/2026 | 10-Q |
| 03/31/2026 | 05/15/2026 | 10-Q |
| 12/31/2025 | 03/31/2026 | 10-K |
| 09/30/2025 | 11/14/2025 | 10-Q |
| 06/30/2025 | 08/14/2025 | 10-Q |
| 03/31/2025 | 05/15/2025 | 10-Q |
| 12/31/2024 | 04/15/2025 | 10-K |
| 09/30/2024 | 11/14/2024 | 10-Q |
| 06/30/2024 | 08/14/2024 | 10-Q |
| 03/31/2024 | 05/15/2024 | 10-Q |
| 12/31/2023 | 04/01/2024 | 10-K |
| 06/30/2023 | 11/13/2023 | 424B3 |
| Report Date | Filing Date | Filing |
|---|---|---|
| 06/30/2026 | 08/14/2026 | 10-Q |
| 03/31/2026 | 05/15/2026 | 10-Q |
| 12/31/2025 | 03/31/2026 | 10-K |
| 09/30/2025 | 11/14/2025 | 10-Q |
| 06/30/2025 | 08/14/2025 | 10-Q |
| 03/31/2025 | 05/15/2025 | 10-Q |
| 12/31/2024 | 04/15/2025 | 10-K |
| 09/30/2024 | 11/14/2024 | 10-Q |
| 06/30/2024 | 08/14/2024 | 10-Q |
| 03/31/2024 | 05/15/2024 | 10-Q |
| 12/31/2023 | 04/01/2024 | 10-K |
| 06/30/2023 | 11/13/2023 | 424B3 |
Industry Resources
| Information Technology Resources |
| TechCrunch |
| Wired |
| CIO |
| MIT Technology Review |
| Gartner Insights |
| Ars Technica |
| Application Software Resources |
| Capterra |
| Software Advice |
| InfoWorld |
External Quote Links
| Y Finance | Barrons |
| TradingView | Morningstar |
| SeekingAlpha | ValueLine |
| Motley Fool | Robinhood |
| CNBC | Etrade |
| MarketWatch | Unusual Whales |
| YCharts | Perplexity Finance |
| FinViz |
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