Open Lending (LPRO)
Market Price (2/12/2026): $1.515 | Market Cap: $179.0 MilSector: Financials | Industry: Consumer Finance
Open Lending (LPRO)
Market Price (2/12/2026): $1.515Market Cap: $179.0 MilSector: FinancialsIndustry: Consumer Finance
Investment Highlights Why It Matters Detailed financial logic regarding cash flow yields vs trend-riding momentum.
| Cash is significant % of market capNet D/ENet Debt/Equity. Debt net of cash. Negative indicates net cash. Equity is taken as the Market Capitalization is -21% | Weak multi-year price returns2Y Excs Rtn is -118%, 3Y Excs Rtn is -152% | Not profitable at operating income levelOp Inc LTMOperating Income, Last Twelve Months is -84 Mil, Op Mgn LTMOperating Margin = Operating Income / Revenue Reflects profitability before taxes and before impact of capital structure (interest payments). is -498% |
| Valuation becoming less expensiveP/S 6M Chg %Price/Sales change over 6 months. Declining P/S indicates valuation has become less expensive. is -32% | Expensive valuation multiplesP/SPrice/Sales ratio is 11x | |
| Megatrend and thematic driversMegatrends include Fintech & Digital Payments, AI in Financial Services, and Cloud Computing. Themes include Online Banking & Lending, Show more. | Weak revenue growthRev Chg LTMRevenue Change % Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -82%, Rev Chg 3Y AvgRevenue Change % averaged over trailing 3 years is -48% | |
| Significant share based compensationSBC/Rev LTMShare Based Compensation / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is 47% | ||
| Not cash flow generativeCFO/Rev LTMCash Flow from Operations / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -71%, FCF/Rev LTMFree Cash Flow / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -83% | ||
| Yield minus risk free rate is negativeERPEquity Risk Premium (ERP) = Total Yield - Risk Free Rate, Reflects the premium above risk free assets offered by the investment. is -88% | ||
| Key risksLPRO key risks include an ongoing securities lawsuit and accounting scandal for allegedly misrepresenting its risk models and loan performance [1], Show more. |
| Cash is significant % of market capNet D/ENet Debt/Equity. Debt net of cash. Negative indicates net cash. Equity is taken as the Market Capitalization is -21% |
| Valuation becoming less expensiveP/S 6M Chg %Price/Sales change over 6 months. Declining P/S indicates valuation has become less expensive. is -32% |
| Megatrend and thematic driversMegatrends include Fintech & Digital Payments, AI in Financial Services, and Cloud Computing. Themes include Online Banking & Lending, Show more. |
| Weak multi-year price returns2Y Excs Rtn is -118%, 3Y Excs Rtn is -152% |
| Not profitable at operating income levelOp Inc LTMOperating Income, Last Twelve Months is -84 Mil, Op Mgn LTMOperating Margin = Operating Income / Revenue Reflects profitability before taxes and before impact of capital structure (interest payments). is -498% |
| Expensive valuation multiplesP/SPrice/Sales ratio is 11x |
| Weak revenue growthRev Chg LTMRevenue Change % Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -82%, Rev Chg 3Y AvgRevenue Change % averaged over trailing 3 years is -48% |
| Significant share based compensationSBC/Rev LTMShare Based Compensation / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is 47% |
| Not cash flow generativeCFO/Rev LTMCash Flow from Operations / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -71%, FCF/Rev LTMFree Cash Flow / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -83% |
| Yield minus risk free rate is negativeERPEquity Risk Premium (ERP) = Total Yield - Risk Free Rate, Reflects the premium above risk free assets offered by the investment. is -88% |
| Key risksLPRO key risks include an ongoing securities lawsuit and accounting scandal for allegedly misrepresenting its risk models and loan performance [1], Show more. |
Qualitative Assessment
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1. Disappointing Q3 2025 Financial Performance Despite Revenue Beat.
While Open Lending reported slightly better-than-expected earnings per share and revenue for the third quarter of 2025, the company posted a net loss of $7.6 million, a significant decline from the net income recorded in the prior year. This loss was partly attributed to an $11 million non-recurring expense. Furthermore, key operational metrics such as certified loans and average profit share revenue per certified loan experienced year-over-year decreases. This mixed financial report, particularly the net loss and falling loan volumes, led to an immediate decline in the stock price, falling over 8% in after-hours trading following the announcement.
2. Significant Analyst Downgrades and Price Target Reductions.
During this period, several analyst firms revised their outlooks negatively for Open Lending. Notably, Canaccord Genuity drastically cut its price target for LPRO from $7.00 to $2.00 on November 13, 2025, while maintaining a "hold" rating. Other brokerages also issued or maintained "hold" or "sell" ratings, and the overall consensus price targets were considerably lower than previous estimates, reflecting a diminished confidence in the company's future growth trajectory and profitability.
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Stock Movement Drivers
Fundamental Drivers
The -20.5% change in LPRO stock from 10/31/2025 to 2/11/2026 was primarily driven by a -24.2% change in the company's P/S Multiple.| (LTM values as of) | 10312025 | 2112026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Price ($) | 1.90 | 1.51 | -20.5% |
| Change Contribution By: | |||
| Total Revenues ($ Mil) | 16 | 17 | 4.3% |
| P/S Multiple | 13.9 | 10.5 | -24.2% |
| Shares Outstanding (Mil) | 119 | 118 | 0.6% |
| Cumulative Contribution | -20.5% |
Market Drivers
10/31/2025 to 2/11/2026| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| LPRO | -20.5% | |
| Market (SPY) | 1.5% | 40.9% |
| Sector (XLF) | 0.7% | 30.2% |
Fundamental Drivers
The -31.1% change in LPRO stock from 7/31/2025 to 2/11/2026 was primarily driven by a -28.9% change in the company's P/S Multiple.| (LTM values as of) | 7312025 | 2112026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Price ($) | 2.19 | 1.51 | -31.1% |
| Change Contribution By: | |||
| Total Revenues ($ Mil) | 18 | 17 | -4.1% |
| P/S Multiple | 14.8 | 10.5 | -28.9% |
| Shares Outstanding (Mil) | 119 | 118 | 1.1% |
| Cumulative Contribution | -31.1% |
Market Drivers
7/31/2025 to 2/11/2026| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| LPRO | -31.1% | |
| Market (SPY) | 9.8% | 32.8% |
| Sector (XLF) | 1.0% | 27.9% |
Fundamental Drivers
The -75.0% change in LPRO stock from 1/31/2025 to 2/11/2026 was primarily driven by a -82.3% change in the company's Total Revenues ($ Mil).| (LTM values as of) | 1312025 | 2112026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Price ($) | 6.05 | 1.51 | -75.0% |
| Change Contribution By: | |||
| Total Revenues ($ Mil) | 96 | 17 | -82.3% |
| P/S Multiple | 7.5 | 10.5 | 39.9% |
| Shares Outstanding (Mil) | 119 | 118 | 0.9% |
| Cumulative Contribution | -75.0% |
Market Drivers
1/31/2025 to 2/11/2026| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| LPRO | -75.0% | |
| Market (SPY) | 16.0% | 27.4% |
| Sector (XLF) | 3.5% | 26.7% |
Fundamental Drivers
The -82.8% change in LPRO stock from 1/31/2023 to 2/11/2026 was primarily driven by a -91.7% change in the company's Total Revenues ($ Mil).| (LTM values as of) | 1312023 | 2112026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Price ($) | 8.77 | 1.51 | -82.8% |
| Change Contribution By: | |||
| Total Revenues ($ Mil) | 204 | 17 | -91.7% |
| P/S Multiple | 5.4 | 10.5 | 94.4% |
| Shares Outstanding (Mil) | 126 | 118 | 6.8% |
| Cumulative Contribution | -82.8% |
Market Drivers
1/31/2023 to 2/11/2026| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| LPRO | -82.8% | |
| Market (SPY) | 76.6% | 30.3% |
| Sector (XLF) | 50.9% | 29.4% |
Price Returns Compared
| 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Total [1] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Returns | |||||||
| LPRO Return | -36% | -70% | 26% | -30% | -74% | 4% | -95% |
| Peers Return | 35% | -35% | 37% | 41% | 30% | -15% | 88% |
| S&P 500 Return | 27% | -19% | 24% | 23% | 16% | 1% | 85% |
Monthly Win Rates [3] | |||||||
| LPRO Win Rate | 33% | 17% | 50% | 33% | 42% | 50% | |
| Peers Win Rate | 62% | 38% | 52% | 60% | 65% | 30% | |
| S&P 500 Win Rate | 75% | 42% | 67% | 75% | 67% | 100% | |
Max Drawdowns [4] | |||||||
| LPRO Max Drawdown | -39% | -73% | -15% | -46% | -86% | 0% | |
| Peers Max Drawdown | -6% | -41% | -19% | -16% | -29% | -18% | |
| S&P 500 Max Drawdown | -1% | -25% | -1% | -2% | -15% | -1% | |
[1] Cumulative total returns since the beginning of 2021
[2] Peers: PRAA, AXP, COF, SYF, SOFI.
[3] Win Rate = % of calendar months in which monthly returns were positive
[4] Max drawdown represents maximum peak-to-trough decline within a year
[5] 2026 data is for the year up to 2/11/2026 (YTD)
How Low Can It Go
| Event | LPRO | S&P 500 |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 Inflation Shock | ||
| % Loss | -86.7% | -25.4% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 649.4% | 34.1% |
| Time to Breakeven | Not Fully Recovered days | 464 days |
| 2020 Covid Pandemic | ||
| % Loss | -11.4% | -33.9% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 12.9% | 51.3% |
| Time to Breakeven | 8 days | 148 days |
| 2018 Correction | ||
| % Loss | -12.3% | -19.8% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 14.0% | 24.7% |
| Time to Breakeven | 534 days | 120 days |
Compare to PRAA, AXP, COF, SYF, SOFI
In The Past
Open Lending's stock fell -86.7% during the 2022 Inflation Shock from a high on 6/30/2021. A -86.7% loss requires a 649.4% gain to breakeven.
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About Open Lending (LPRO)
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Here are 1-3 brief analogies for Open Lending (LPRO):- Stripe for near-prime auto lending: Just as Stripe provides the infrastructure for businesses to easily accept payments, Open Lending provides the technology and risk assessment tools for financial institutions to safely originate near-prime and sub-prime auto loans.
- Shopify for banks looking to expand into near-prime auto loans: Similar to how Shopify empowers merchants to easily set up and run online stores, Open Lending provides a platform that enables banks and credit unions to profitably access and lend in the near-prime auto loan market.
- Lemonade for bank auto loan risk assessment: Much like Lemonade uses AI and data to streamline and price insurance policies, Open Lending leverages proprietary data and analytics to assess and manage the risk of auto loans for their financial institution clients, often bundling credit default insurance.
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- Auto Loan Risk Management and Profitability Solutions: Open Lending's Lenders Protection™ Program provides financial institutions with proprietary data, analytics, and credit default insurance to profitably originate auto loans for near-prime and sub-prime borrowers while mitigating risk.
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Open Lending (LPRO) primarily sells its services and technology platform to other companies, specifically financial institutions.
However, Open Lending's business model involves a broad network of hundreds of lender partners. Their public filings (e.g., their 2023 10-K report) explicitly state that no single customer accounted for more than 10% of their total revenues for the past several years. Therefore, there are no individually named "major customers" in the traditional sense that would be disclosed as material to the company's financials.
Instead of specific major companies, Open Lending's customer base consists of a diverse range of financial institutions. The primary categories of these institutional customers are:
- Credit Unions: A significant portion of Open Lending's lender partners are credit unions across the United States. Most credit unions are private entities and do not have stock symbols.
- Banks: Open Lending also partners with various banks, including regional and community banks. Similar to credit unions, many of these institutions are private, or if public, no single bank represents a "major" customer for Open Lending in terms of revenue concentration.
Given the lack of revenue concentration from any single client, it is not possible to list specific named major customer companies with their symbols, as such individual "major customers" do not exist within Open Lending's business model.
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- AmTrust Financial Services, Inc.
- Experian (EXPN.L)
- TransUnion (TRU)
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Jessica Buss Chief Executive Officer
Jessica Buss was appointed Chief Executive Officer of Open Lending in March 2025. She brings extensive experience from the insurance industry, having previously served as CEO of Argo Group International Holdings. Ms. Buss also served on Open Lending's Board of Directors for five years prior to her CEO appointment. She holds a bachelor's degree in accounting from the University of Wisconsin and a Master of Business Administration from the University of Florida.
Massimo Monaco Chief Financial Officer
Massimo Monaco has served as Chief Financial Officer of Open Lending since August 2025. Prior to joining Open Lending, he was Chief Financial Officer of Arc Home LLC, a residential mortgage lender, from December 2018 to July 2025. From December 2016 to December 2018, Mr. Monaco served as the Chief Financial Officer at American Financial Resources, another national residential mortgage lender. He previously held various senior finance roles at PHH Corp., a public company specializing in residential mortgage and fleet leasing. Mr. Monaco received a Bachelor of Arts degree and a Master of Business Administration degree from La Salle University.
Michelle Glasl Chief Operating Officer
Michelle Glasl was appointed Chief Operating Officer in March 2025. Before her role at Open Lending, Ms. Glasl served as the Head of Operations of Argo Group International Holdings, Ltd. from November 2023 to March 2025, and as SVP of Strategy and Business Development at Argo Group from September 2022 to November 2023. Her previous experience includes serving as Chief Information Officer at GuideOne Insurance and Vice President of Technology at State Auto. Ms. Glasl holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee.
Sarah Lackey Chief Technology Officer
As Chief Technology Officer, Sarah Lackey leads the vision for all aspects of technology at Open Lending. She previously served as Open Lending's Senior Vice President of IT Operations since November 2019 and held various other roles within the company's technology department since 2016. Ms. Lackey has over 15 years of experience in IT leadership, infrastructure, and systems design. Prior to joining Open Lending, she spent 14 years with Hewlett Packard Enterprise in roles such as scrum of scrums master, system software engineer, project manager, and program manager. She also served as Vice President and co-owner of SJB Industries DBA Bates Painting. Ms. Lackey earned her bachelor's degree in computer science from Texas A&M University.
Charles "Chuck" Jehl Director
Charles "Chuck" Jehl currently serves as a Director on Open Lending's Board. He was previously the Interim Chief Financial Officer and served as CEO from September 2024 to March 2025. Mr. Jehl was instrumental in taking Open Lending public in June 2020, a transaction involving Nebula Acquisition Corporation, which was advised by private equity firm True Wind Capital Management, L.P. Prior to Open Lending, he spent 14 years at Forestar Group Inc., a New York Stock Exchange-listed company, in various executive leadership roles including Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer. He also held leadership roles at Guaranty Insurance Services Inc. Mr. Jehl is a Certified Public Accountant and holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Accounting from Concordia University at Austin.
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The key risks to Open Lending's business (LPRO) are primarily centered around financial integrity, market conditions, and its target customer base.
- Accounting Irregularities and Securities Fraud Lawsuit: Open Lending faces a significant risk due to an ongoing accounting scandal and a securities class-action lawsuit. The company is accused of misleading investors by misrepresenting its risk-based pricing models, issuing materially misleading statements regarding profit share revenue, and failing to disclose the deteriorating performance of its 2021-2024 vintage loans, including elevated delinquencies and defaults. These allegations led to a substantial drop in the company's stock price and a significant quarterly revenue loss, driven by an $81.3 million write-down in profit share revenue tied to defaulted loans.
- Deteriorating Auto Loans Market and Declining Loan Volumes/Profitability: The company is highly susceptible to the challenging conditions in the U.S. auto loan market. Open Lending has experienced a multi-quarter trend of declining certified loan volumes, which has put pressure on its total revenues, profit share revenue, and adjusted EBITDA margins. Management has also indicated expectations for continued sequential declines in certified loan volumes in the near term, reflecting a broader crunch in the auto loans sector.
- Vulnerability to Near-Prime and Non-Prime Borrower Performance: Open Lending's business model primarily focuses on enabling loans for near-prime and non-prime borrowers, a demographic inherently more susceptible to economic fluctuations and credit market shifts. While the company has reportedly been shifting its focus towards higher-quality loans and reducing exposure to riskier segments, its reliance on this borrower segment means that broader economic pressures can lead to increased delinquencies and defaults, directly impacting its financial performance and the effectiveness of its risk models.
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Open Lending (LPRO) primarily serves the U.S. automotive lending market, focusing on near-prime and non-prime borrowers. The addressable markets for their main products and services are as follows:
- Near-prime and Non-prime Auto Loan Origination Market: The annual addressable market for near-prime and non-prime automotive loan originations in the U.S. is estimated to be $270 billion.
- Near-prime and Non-prime Auto Loan Refinancing Market: The annual market opportunity for the refinancing of near-prime and non-prime automotive loans in the U.S. is estimated at $40 billion.
- ApexOne Auto Platform: Open Lending's new ApexOne Auto platform targets an additional annual market opportunity of approximately $500 million within the U.S. automotive credit market, serving segments not covered by their existing decisioning engine.
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Here are the expected drivers of future revenue growth for Open Lending (LPRO) over the next 2-3 years:- Launch and Adoption of ApexOne Auto: Open Lending anticipates significant revenue growth from the introduction and wider adoption of ApexOne Auto, a new prime credit automated decisioning platform. This initiative is designed to diversify the company's revenue streams and tap into a broader segment of the auto lending market. The platform targets a substantial market opportunity.
- Growth in Credit Union and Bank Partnerships: The company is strategically shifting its focus towards increasing partnerships with credit unions and banks. This channel mix is expected to drive revenue growth as these institutions typically offer higher program fees, leading to more favorable unit economics for Open Lending. This strategic emphasis aims to expand their customer base within these lucrative channels.
- Increase in Overall Certified Loan Volume: Despite recent macroeconomic headwinds impacting loan certifications, Open Lending's strategic initiatives, including new product launches and enhanced partnerships, are aimed at driving a renewed increase in the volume of certified loans. The company has previously aimed to significantly increase its platform usage and facilitated loans, indicating a focus on expanding its core business volume.
- Diversification into New Lending Solutions: Beyond its current offerings, Open Lending plans to diversify its product portfolio by investing in the development of additional lending solutions. This expansion into new product categories is a key long-term strategy to capture new market opportunities and create additional revenue streams.
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Share Repurchases
- In November 2022, Open Lending's Board of Directors authorized a share repurchase program for up to $75.0 million, under which the company repurchased $18.0 million in 2022 and $37.3 million in 2023.
- In March 2021, Open Lending announced a plan to repurchase $20 million worth of shares from selling stockholders in conjunction with a secondary offering.
- A new share repurchase program of up to $25.0 million was authorized in May 2025, expiring in May 2026. As of Q3 2025, $21 million remained under this program, with $4.0 million repurchased in Q2 2025.
Share Issuance
- Open Lending's common stock began trading on Nasdaq in June 2020 following a business combination. The company is authorized to issue 550,000,000 shares of common stock.
- The company issued 406,801 shares and 530,206 shares of common stock, net of shares withheld for taxes, related to Restricted Stock Units (RSUs) during the years ended December 31, 2023, and December 31, 2024, respectively.
- The 2020 Stock Option and Incentive Plan provides for an automatic annual increase of shares reserved for issuance by 4% of outstanding common stock each January 1, beginning in 2021.
Inbound Investments
- In June 2020, Open Lending was acquired by Nebula Acquisition Corporation, a Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) sponsored by True Wind Capital, in a business combination valued at approximately $1.7 billion.
- As part of its IPO in connection with the SPAC merger, True Wind Capital anchored a $200 million Private Investment in Public Equity (PIPE) in Open Lending.
Outbound Investments
- Open Lending internally developed its new ApexOne Auto decisioning platform, with no large outside capital investments made for its development.
Latest Trefis Analyses
| Title | Date | |
|---|---|---|
| DASHBOARDS | ||
| Open Lending Earnings Notes | 12/16/2025 | |
| Open Lending Stock Lost 13%, Buy Or Wait? | 10/17/2025 | |
| Open Lending Total Shareholder Return (TSR): 26.1% in 2023 and 0% 3-yr returns (below peer average) | 03/07/2025 |
| Title | |
|---|---|
| ARTICLES |
Research & Analysis
Invest in Strategies
Wealth Management
Peer Comparisons
| Peers to compare with: |
Financials
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| Mkt Price | 46.74 |
| Mkt Cap | 24.9 |
| Rev LTM | 9,152 |
| Op Inc LTM | 62 |
| FCF LTM | 4,918 |
| FCF 3Y Avg | 4,733 |
| CFO LTM | 4,919 |
| CFO 3Y Avg | 4,734 |
Growth & Margins
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| Rev Chg LTM | 10.6% |
| Rev Chg 3Y Avg | 9.9% |
| Rev Chg Q | 10.6% |
| QoQ Delta Rev Chg LTM | 3.5% |
| Op Mgn LTM | -239.9% |
| Op Mgn 3Y Avg | -71.7% |
| QoQ Delta Op Mgn LTM | -19.0% |
| CFO/Rev LTM | 11.4% |
| CFO/Rev 3Y Avg | 19.0% |
| FCF/Rev LTM | 9.5% |
| FCF/Rev 3Y Avg | 14.7% |
Valuation
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| Mkt Cap | 24.9 |
| P/S | 3.1 |
| P/EBIT | -2.4 |
| P/E | 14.9 |
| P/CFO | -2.8 |
| Total Yield | 2.3% |
| Dividend Yield | 0.0% |
| FCF Yield 3Y Avg | 5.0% |
| D/E | 0.5 |
| Net D/E | -0.1 |
Returns
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| 1M Rtn | -15.4% |
| 3M Rtn | -6.9% |
| 6M Rtn | -7.1% |
| 12M Rtn | 11.4% |
| 3Y Rtn | 99.7% |
| 1M Excs Rtn | -14.9% |
| 3M Excs Rtn | -4.7% |
| 6M Excs Rtn | -14.5% |
| 12M Excs Rtn | -3.1% |
| 3Y Excs Rtn | 30.6% |
Segment Financials
Revenue by Segment| $ Mil | 2024 | 2023 | 2022 | 2021 | 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Single segment | 117 | ||||
| Claims administration and other service fees | 9 | 7 | 5 | 3 | |
| Profit share | 90 | 133 | 60 | 53 | |
| Program fees | 81 | 76 | 44 | 37 | |
| Total | 117 | 180 | 216 | 109 | 93 |
| $ Mil | 2024 | 2023 | 2022 | 2021 | 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Single segment | 29 | ||||
| Total | 29 |
| $ Mil | 2024 | 2023 | 2022 | 2021 | 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Single segment | 22 | ||||
| Total | 22 |
Price Behavior
| Market Price | $1.51 | |
| Market Cap ($ Bil) | 0.2 | |
| First Trading Date | 03/06/2018 | |
| Distance from 52W High | -74.8% | |
| 50 Days | 200 Days | |
| DMA Price | $1.78 | $1.95 |
| DMA Trend | indeterminate | up |
| Distance from DMA | -15.3% | -22.7% |
| 3M | 1YR | |
| Volatility | 68.0% | 98.4% |
| Downside Capture | 351.86 | 275.15 |
| Upside Capture | 276.25 | 95.42 |
| Correlation (SPY) | 37.9% | 27.2% |
| 1M | 2M | 3M | 6M | 1Y | 3Y | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Beta | 2.91 | 2.26 | 2.61 | 1.85 | 1.38 | 1.44 |
| Up Beta | -0.63 | -0.83 | 4.02 | 2.74 | 0.76 | 0.91 |
| Down Beta | 2.28 | 2.03 | 1.01 | 1.26 | 1.51 | 1.41 |
| Up Capture | 566% | 286% | 303% | 131% | 85% | 188% |
| Bmk +ve Days | 11 | 22 | 34 | 71 | 142 | 430 |
| Stock +ve Days | 9 | 17 | 27 | 55 | 104 | 357 |
| Down Capture | 307% | 306% | 275% | 203% | 156% | 112% |
| Bmk -ve Days | 9 | 19 | 27 | 54 | 109 | 321 |
| Stock -ve Days | 9 | 20 | 30 | 63 | 138 | 378 |
[1] Upside and downside betas calculated using positive and negative benchmark daily returns respectively
Based On 1-Year Data
| Annualized Return | Annualized Volatility | Sharpe Ratio | Correlation with LPRO | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LPRO | -76.4% | 98.3% | -0.92 | - |
| Sector ETF (XLF) | 3.7% | 19.2% | 0.06 | 27.1% |
| Equity (SPY) | 15.5% | 19.3% | 0.62 | 27.5% |
| Gold (GLD) | 75.7% | 24.9% | 2.23 | -0.2% |
| Commodities (DBC) | 8.8% | 16.6% | 0.34 | 10.3% |
| Real Estate (VNQ) | 6.0% | 16.6% | 0.18 | 16.2% |
| Bitcoin (BTCUSD) | -29.3% | 44.7% | -0.64 | 17.2% |
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Based On 5-Year Data
| Annualized Return | Annualized Volatility | Sharpe Ratio | Correlation with LPRO | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LPRO | -48.5% | 68.4% | -0.65 | - |
| Sector ETF (XLF) | 13.2% | 18.7% | 0.57 | 36.3% |
| Equity (SPY) | 13.9% | 17.0% | 0.65 | 41.9% |
| Gold (GLD) | 22.9% | 16.9% | 1.10 | 6.0% |
| Commodities (DBC) | 11.4% | 18.9% | 0.49 | 7.9% |
| Real Estate (VNQ) | 5.1% | 18.8% | 0.18 | 35.1% |
| Bitcoin (BTCUSD) | 13.3% | 57.9% | 0.45 | 21.4% |
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Based On 10-Year Data
| Annualized Return | Annualized Volatility | Sharpe Ratio | Correlation with LPRO | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LPRO | -17.2% | 57.4% | -0.15 | - |
| Sector ETF (XLF) | 14.0% | 22.2% | 0.58 | 23.3% |
| Equity (SPY) | 15.6% | 17.9% | 0.75 | 29.8% |
| Gold (GLD) | 15.7% | 15.5% | 0.85 | 6.2% |
| Commodities (DBC) | 8.2% | 17.6% | 0.39 | 7.3% |
| Real Estate (VNQ) | 6.1% | 20.7% | 0.26 | 24.1% |
| Bitcoin (BTCUSD) | 68.7% | 66.7% | 1.08 | 15.3% |
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Returns Analyses
Earnings Returns History
Expand for More| Forward Returns | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Date | 1D Returns | 5D Returns | 21D Returns |
| 11/6/2025 | -9.9% | 0.6% | 3.7% |
| 8/6/2025 | 5.1% | 0.9% | 5.6% |
| 3/31/2025 | -57.6% | -64.3% | -55.1% |
| 11/7/2024 | -12.6% | -6.5% | -7.9% |
| 8/8/2024 | 0.5% | -2.0% | 1.6% |
| 5/7/2024 | 5.3% | 18.7% | 31.4% |
| 2/27/2024 | -8.6% | -15.5% | -22.8% |
| 11/7/2023 | -10.4% | -9.7% | 2.3% |
| ... | |||
| SUMMARY STATS | |||
| # Positive | 10 | 10 | 12 |
| # Negative | 10 | 10 | 8 |
| Median Positive | 5.7% | 8.4% | 11.6% |
| Median Negative | -11.5% | -12.6% | -18.6% |
| Max Positive | 24.6% | 24.3% | 42.3% |
| Max Negative | -57.6% | -64.3% | -55.1% |
SEC Filings
Expand for More| Report Date | Filing Date | Filing |
|---|---|---|
| 09/30/2025 | 11/06/2025 | 10-Q |
| 06/30/2025 | 08/07/2025 | 10-Q |
| 03/31/2025 | 05/08/2025 | 10-Q |
| 12/31/2024 | 03/31/2025 | 10-K |
| 09/30/2024 | 11/08/2024 | 10-Q |
| 06/30/2024 | 08/09/2024 | 10-Q |
| 03/31/2024 | 05/08/2024 | 10-Q |
| 12/31/2023 | 02/28/2024 | 10-K |
| 09/30/2023 | 11/08/2023 | 10-Q |
| 06/30/2023 | 08/09/2023 | 10-Q |
| 03/31/2023 | 05/10/2023 | 10-Q |
| 12/31/2022 | 02/28/2023 | 10-K |
| 09/30/2022 | 11/04/2022 | 10-Q |
| 06/30/2022 | 08/05/2022 | 10-Q |
| 03/31/2022 | 05/06/2022 | 10-Q |
| 12/31/2021 | 02/28/2022 | 10-K |
External Quote Links
| Y Finance | Barrons |
| TradingView | Morningstar |
| SeekingAlpha | ValueLine |
| Motley Fool | Robinhood |
| CNBC | Etrade |
| MarketWatch | Unusual Whales |
| YCharts | Perplexity Finance |
| FinViz |
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