Katapult (KPLT)
Market Price (1/27/2026): $6.66 | Market Cap: $35.2 MilSector: Information Technology | Industry: Systems Software
Katapult (KPLT)
Market Price (1/27/2026): $6.66Market Cap: $35.2 MilSector: Information TechnologyIndustry: Systems Software
Investment Highlights Why It Matters Detailed financial logic regarding cash flow yields vs trend-riding momentum.
| Valuation becoming less expensiveP/S 6M Chg %Price/Sales change over 6 months. Declining P/S indicates valuation has become less expensive. is -42% | Weak multi-year price returns2Y Excs Rtn is -82%, 3Y Excs Rtn is -152% | Not profitable at operating income levelOp Inc LTMOperating Income, Last Twelve Months is -0.7 Mil, Op Mgn LTMOperating Margin = Operating Income / Revenue Reflects profitability before taxes and before impact of capital structure (interest payments). is -0.2% |
| Megatrend and thematic driversMegatrends include Fintech & Digital Payments. Themes include Lease-to-Own E-commerce Financing. | Debt is significantNet D/ENet Debt/Equity. Debt net of cash. Negative indicates net cash. Equity is taken as the Market Capitalization is 311% | |
| Not cash flow generativeCFO/Rev LTMCash Flow from Operations / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -9.9%, FCF/Rev LTMFree Cash Flow / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -10% | ||
| Yield minus risk free rate is negativeERPEquity Risk Premium (ERP) = Total Yield - Risk Free Rate, Reflects the premium above risk free assets offered by the investment. is -84% | ||
| Key risksKPLT key risks include [1] substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern due to significant indebtedness maturing in June 2025, Show more. |
| Valuation becoming less expensiveP/S 6M Chg %Price/Sales change over 6 months. Declining P/S indicates valuation has become less expensive. is -42% |
| Megatrend and thematic driversMegatrends include Fintech & Digital Payments. Themes include Lease-to-Own E-commerce Financing. |
| Weak multi-year price returns2Y Excs Rtn is -82%, 3Y Excs Rtn is -152% |
| Not profitable at operating income levelOp Inc LTMOperating Income, Last Twelve Months is -0.7 Mil, Op Mgn LTMOperating Margin = Operating Income / Revenue Reflects profitability before taxes and before impact of capital structure (interest payments). is -0.2% |
| Debt is significantNet D/ENet Debt/Equity. Debt net of cash. Negative indicates net cash. Equity is taken as the Market Capitalization is 311% |
| Not cash flow generativeCFO/Rev LTMCash Flow from Operations / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -9.9%, FCF/Rev LTMFree Cash Flow / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -10% |
| Yield minus risk free rate is negativeERPEquity Risk Premium (ERP) = Total Yield - Risk Free Rate, Reflects the premium above risk free assets offered by the investment. is -84% |
| Key risksKPLT key risks include [1] substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern due to significant indebtedness maturing in June 2025, Show more. |
Qualitative Assessment
AI Analysis | Feedback
1. Q3 2025 Earnings Miss and Tempered Outlook: Katapult reported a Q3 2025 EPS of -$0.94, significantly missing analyst consensus estimates of -$0.22, and revenue of $74.04 million, falling short of expectations of $74.55 million. Despite reporting year-over-year growth in gross originations and revenue, the company also updated its full-year 2025 outlook with tempered expectations due to ongoing macroeconomic challenges impacting non-prime consumers.
2. Dilutive All-Stock Merger Agreement: On December 12, 2025, Katapult announced a definitive all-stock agreement to combine with The Aaron's Company, Inc. and CCF Holdings LLC. Under this agreement, current Katapult stockholders would own only 6% of the combined company, indicating a significant dilutive effect on existing ownership.
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Stock Movement Drivers
Fundamental Drivers
The -44.2% change in KPLT stock from 9/30/2025 to 1/26/2026 was primarily driven by a -41.8% change in the company's P/S Multiple.| (LTM values as of) | 9302025 | 1262026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Price ($) | 11.96 | 6.67 | -44.2% |
| Change Contribution By: | |||
| Total Revenues ($ Mil) | 267 | 281 | 5.1% |
| P/S Multiple | 0.2 | 0.1 | -41.8% |
| Shares Outstanding (Mil) | 5 | 5 | -8.8% |
| Cumulative Contribution | -44.2% |
Market Drivers
9/30/2025 to 1/26/2026| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| KPLT | -44.2% | |
| Market (SPY) | 4.0% | 0.3% |
| Sector (XLK) | 3.7% | -2.6% |
Fundamental Drivers
The -16.7% change in KPLT stock from 6/30/2025 to 1/26/2026 was primarily driven by a -13.9% change in the company's P/S Multiple.| (LTM values as of) | 6302025 | 1262026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Price ($) | 8.01 | 6.67 | -16.7% |
| Change Contribution By: | |||
| Total Revenues ($ Mil) | 254 | 281 | 10.5% |
| P/S Multiple | 0.1 | 0.1 | -13.9% |
| Shares Outstanding (Mil) | 5 | 5 | -12.5% |
| Cumulative Contribution | -16.7% |
Market Drivers
6/30/2025 to 1/26/2026| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| KPLT | -16.7% | |
| Market (SPY) | 12.4% | -5.2% |
| Sector (XLK) | 15.5% | -9.8% |
Fundamental Drivers
The -1.4% change in KPLT stock from 12/31/2024 to 1/26/2026 was primarily driven by a -17.8% change in the company's Shares Outstanding (Mil).| (LTM values as of) | 12312024 | 1262026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Price ($) | 6.76 | 6.67 | -1.4% |
| Change Contribution By: | |||
| Total Revenues ($ Mil) | 242 | 281 | 16.2% |
| P/S Multiple | 0.1 | 0.1 | 3.2% |
| Shares Outstanding (Mil) | 4 | 5 | -17.8% |
| Cumulative Contribution | -1.4% |
Market Drivers
12/31/2024 to 1/26/2026| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| KPLT | -1.4% | |
| Market (SPY) | 19.2% | 0.6% |
| Sector (XLK) | 26.2% | -2.0% |
Fundamental Drivers
The -72.1% change in KPLT stock from 12/31/2022 to 1/26/2026 was primarily driven by a -68.5% change in the company's P/S Multiple.| (LTM values as of) | 12312022 | 1262026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Price ($) | 23.92 | 6.67 | -72.1% |
| Change Contribution By: | |||
| Total Revenues ($ Mil) | 237 | 281 | 18.7% |
| P/S Multiple | 0.4 | 0.1 | -68.5% |
| Shares Outstanding (Mil) | 4 | 5 | -25.4% |
| Cumulative Contribution | -72.1% |
Market Drivers
12/31/2022 to 1/26/2026| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| KPLT | -72.1% | |
| Market (SPY) | 87.9% | 6.7% |
| Sector (XLK) | 139.6% | 2.8% |
Price Returns Compared
| 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Total [1] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Returns | |||||||
| KPLT Return | -73% | -72% | -54% | -38% | -5% | 3% | -98% |
| Peers Return | 1% | -61% | 105% | 36% | -10% | 1% | -1% |
| S&P 500 Return | 27% | -19% | 24% | 23% | 16% | 2% | 85% |
Monthly Win Rates [3] | |||||||
| KPLT Win Rate | 25% | 25% | 42% | 33% | 50% | 100% | |
| Peers Win Rate | 48% | 35% | 58% | 53% | 53% | 40% | |
| S&P 500 Win Rate | 75% | 42% | 67% | 75% | 67% | 100% | |
Max Drawdowns [4] | |||||||
| KPLT Max Drawdown | -77% | -78% | -64% | -53% | -15% | 0% | |
| Peers Max Drawdown | -22% | -69% | -15% | -19% | -38% | -4% | |
| S&P 500 Max Drawdown | -1% | -25% | -1% | -2% | -15% | -1% | |
[1] Cumulative total returns since the beginning of 2021
[2] Peers: PRG, UPBD, AFRM, PYPL, BFH.
[3] Win Rate = % of calendar months in which monthly returns were positive
[4] Max drawdown represents maximum peak-to-trough decline within a year
[5] 2026 data is for the year up to 1/26/2026 (YTD)
How Low Can It Go
| Event | KPLT | S&P 500 |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 Inflation Shock | ||
| % Loss | -98.2% | -25.4% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 5495.0% | 34.1% |
| Time to Breakeven | Not Fully Recovered days | 464 days |
| 2020 Covid Pandemic | ||
| % Loss | -12.3% | -33.9% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 14.0% | 51.3% |
| Time to Breakeven | 7 days | 148 days |
Compare to PRG, UPBD, AFRM, PYPL, BFH
In The Past
Katapult's stock fell -98.2% during the 2022 Inflation Shock from a high on 2/12/2021. A -98.2% loss requires a 5495.0% gain to breakeven.
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About Katapult (KPLT)
AI Analysis | Feedback
Here are two brief analogies for Katapult (KPLT):
- A digital Rent-A-Center or Aaron's for online shopping.
- Affirm for consumers with no or bad credit, using a lease-to-own model.
AI Analysis | Feedback
- Lease-to-Own Consumer Financing: Provides a flexible lease-to-own payment option for non-prime consumers to acquire durable goods like furniture, electronics, and appliances from participating retail partners.
- Retailer Integration Platform: Offers retailers a technology platform to seamlessly integrate Katapult's lease-to-own solution into their e-commerce and in-store checkout processes, enabling them to serve a broader customer base.
AI Analysis | Feedback
Major Customers of Katapult (KPLT)
Katapult (KPLT) primarily operates as a business-to-business (B2B) service provider. It offers a lease-to-own platform that integrates with e-commerce and omnichannel retailers to provide flexible payment options for their customers. Therefore, Katapult's major customers are the retail companies that adopt and integrate its platform.
Based on company disclosures and investor materials, key retail partners include:
- Wayfair Inc. (W)
- Beyond, Inc. (BYON) (formerly Overstock.com)
- Qurate Retail Group (QRTEA) (which includes brands such as QVC and HSN)
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Orlando Zayas, Chief Executive Officer
Orlando Zayas has been the Chief Executive Officer of Katapult since September 2017. Prior to his tenure at Katapult, he served as the Chief Executive Officer of DRB Capital and as President of TEMPOE, LLC. His career also includes significant leadership roles at GE Capital, Safe-Guard Products International, and GE/Wachovia/Wells Fargo Bank. Zayas successfully led Katabat, a fintech company, to its acquisition by Encore Capital Group. He is also the founder and CEO of Cloud-Analytics. Zayas brings over three decades of experience in the financial services industry.
Nancy Walsh, Chief Financial Officer
Nancy Walsh has served as the Chief Financial Officer of Katapult since December 2022. Before joining Katapult, she was the Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice President of LL Flooring from September 2019 to December 2022. Her previous experience includes roles as Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice President at Pier 1 and The Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. Additionally, Walsh held multiple positions at Coach, including Senior Vice President of Finance, Chief Risk Officer, and Treasurer. She also chairs the audit committee and is a board member for Sportsman's Warehouse (NASDAQ: SPWH).
Derek Medlin, President and Chief Growth Officer
Derek Medlin has been the President and Chief Growth Officer of Katapult since August 2024. Before this, he held the roles of Chief Operating Officer for Katapult from July 2018 to August 2024 and Executive Vice President of Operations from July 2017 to July 2018. Prior to his time at Katapult, Medlin served as an Executive Director at JPMorgan Chase, a Vice President at Elavon (U.S. Bank), and a Senior Analyst at Pyramid Research.
Chandan Chopra, Chief Technology Officer
Chandan Chopra holds the position of Chief Technology Officer at Katapult.
AI Analysis | Feedback
The key risks to Katapult's business are as follows:
- Significant Financial Distress and Going Concern Uncertainty: Katapult has a history of operating losses, including net losses of $25.9 million in 2024 and $36.7 million in 2023. The company also carries substantial indebtedness, with $114.5 million outstanding as of December 31, 2024. A critical concern is the maturity of this debt in June 2025; the failure to refinance could have a material adverse effect on the business and raises substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern. Katapult has not yet achieved GAAP net profit, and its balance sheet shows weaknesses such as a low current ratio of 0.61, indicating potential near-term liquidity issues.
- High Concentration Risk with Wayfair: A significant portion of Katapult's gross originations is concentrated with a single merchant, Wayfair. In 2024, Wayfair accounted for 36% of gross originations, and in 2023, this figure was 49%. Any deterioration in this crucial relationship or with other key merchants could materially and adversely affect Katapult's business.
- Inherent Credit Risk and Exposure to Economic Downturns: Katapult's lease-to-own business model, which serves non-prime consumers, is inherently exposed to credit risk, leading to a high rate of non-payments. Write-offs represented 9.9% of revenue in Q3 2025, indicating a significant operational cost. The company's core customer base is particularly vulnerable to inflation and economic slowdowns, making Katapult highly susceptible to fluctuations in consumer spending patterns and broader economic conditions.
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The increasing expansion of Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL) services into the near-prime and subprime credit segments poses an emerging threat. While many BNPL platforms initially focused on prime borrowers, there is a clear trend towards these providers enhancing their underwriting models to serve a broader range of credit profiles, directly encroaching on Katapult's target market of consumers with less-than-perfect credit. This expansion offers an alternative point-of-sale financing option that could divert both customers and merchant partnerships from Katapult's lease-to-own model.
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Katapult (KPLT) is poised for future revenue growth over the next 2-3 years, driven by several strategic initiatives and expansions. The key drivers are:- Expansion and Adoption of the Katapult App Marketplace and KPay Feature: Katapult is focusing on its proprietary app and KPay feature to drive organic traffic and originations. The Katapult app enhances consumer and merchant engagement, streamlining transactions and significantly increasing self-generated traffic. In Q4 2024, 54% of originations were driven by Katapult's own efforts, and total app originations grew by 32%, with KPay originations increasing by 52% year-over-year, accounting for 41% of total originations. For Q2 2025, total app marketplace gross originations grew 56% year-over-year, and KPay gross originations saw an 81% increase, making up 39% of total gross originations. The company projects at least 20% growth in gross originations and revenue for the full year 2025, with an updated outlook raising gross originations growth to between 20% and 25%.
- Broadening the Merchant Network: Katapult is actively expanding its marketplace by adding new pay-enabled merchants, which broadens consumer choice and enhances the shopping experience. The company has successfully diversified its gross originations base by integrating new direct and waterfall merchants. Notable additions in 2024 included brands like Metro by T-Mobile, Zales, and Rooms to Go, expanding its ecosystem to 33 merchants. This strategy aims to create a larger marketplace and provide more opportunities for gross originations.
- Increased Consumer Engagement and Retention: The company is focused on initiatives to boost top-of-the-funnel activity, leading to more applications, higher customer engagement, and ultimately, improved customer retention. Katapult reported a strong repeat customer rate of 61.5% of gross originations in Q4 2024. Application volume grew 50% year-over-year in Q4 2024, and total app marketplace applications increased by approximately 39% year-over-year in Q2 2025. Additionally, Katapult successfully grew its unique new customer base by approximately 40% year-over-year in Q2 2025 while maintaining a high repeat customer rate.
- Strategic Marketing and Product Feature Enhancements: Katapult is investing in various marketing strategies and introducing new app features to drive demand and improve conversion rates. This includes rolling out multiple marketing efforts to bolster consumer engagement, such as increased communication and new digital advertising channels. The company plans to introduce more features and merchants in 2025 to enhance the shopping experience and encourage repeat customer interactions. These ongoing efforts, combined with testing new pricing and promotional strategies with merchant partners, are designed to drive conversion and engagement, especially during key sales periods.
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- Share Issuance
- On November 3, 2025, Katapult completed a private placement of convertible preferred stock, issuing 35,000 shares of Series A Convertible Preferred Stock and 30,000 shares of Series B Convertible Preferred Stock for aggregate gross proceeds of $65.0 million.
- In connection with a new Refinancing Agreement on June 12, 2025, Katapult issued warrants to Blue Owl Capital, granting them the option to purchase up to 486,264 shares of common stock.
- On June 10, 2024, a prospectus was filed for the offer and sale by selling shareholders of up to 3,377,164 shares of Common Stock, which included 673,300 common shares issuable upon the exercise of warrants.
- Inbound Investments
- On November 3, 2025, Katapult entered into agreements for a $65 million private placement of convertible preferred stock with HHCF Series 21 Sub, LLC, a subsidiary of Hawthorn Horizon Credit Fund, LLC.
- Net proceeds from the Series A issuance ($35 million) were used to fully repay Katapult's term loan, and proceeds from the Series B issuance ($30 million) are earmarked for partial repayment of the revolving loan, transaction expenses, and other corporate purposes.
- Capital Expenditures
- In the last 12 months (prior to November 2025), Katapult reported capital expenditures of -$53,000.
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Peer Comparisons
| Peers to compare with: |
Financials
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| Mkt Price | 44.97 |
| Mkt Cap | 2.3 |
| Rev LTM | 3,627 |
| Op Inc LTM | 413 |
| FCF LTM | 532 |
| FCF 3Y Avg | 291 |
| CFO LTM | 638 |
| CFO 3Y Avg | 379 |
Growth & Margins
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| Rev Chg LTM | 6.0% |
| Rev Chg 3Y Avg | 4.1% |
| Rev Chg Q | 8.1% |
| QoQ Delta Rev Chg LTM | 2.0% |
| Op Mgn LTM | 15.6% |
| Op Mgn 3Y Avg | 5.1% |
| QoQ Delta Op Mgn LTM | 0.2% |
| CFO/Rev LTM | 15.9% |
| CFO/Rev 3Y Avg | 13.6% |
| FCF/Rev LTM | 14.4% |
| FCF/Rev 3Y Avg | 10.1% |
Valuation
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| Mkt Cap | 2.3 |
| P/S | 0.7 |
| P/EBIT | 5.8 |
| P/E | 9.5 |
| P/CFO | 4.9 |
| Total Yield | 11.5% |
| Dividend Yield | 0.6% |
| FCF Yield 3Y Avg | 9.1% |
| D/E | 0.8 |
| Net D/E | 0.2 |
Returns
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| 1M Rtn | -4.1% |
| 3M Rtn | -12.7% |
| 6M Rtn | -9.2% |
| 12M Rtn | -23.2% |
| 3Y Rtn | 23.6% |
| 1M Excs Rtn | -1.2% |
| 3M Excs Rtn | -14.3% |
| 6M Excs Rtn | -17.6% |
| 12M Excs Rtn | -34.2% |
| 3Y Excs Rtn | -40.0% |
Price Behavior
| Market Price | $6.67 | |
| Market Cap ($ Bil) | 0.0 | |
| First Trading Date | 12/30/2019 | |
| Distance from 52W High | -71.2% | |
| 50 Days | 200 Days | |
| DMA Price | $6.50 | $10.27 |
| DMA Trend | down | down |
| Distance from DMA | 2.6% | -35.0% |
| 3M | 1YR | |
| Volatility | 92.3% | 98.1% |
| Downside Capture | 146.10 | 19.33 |
| Upside Capture | -215.84 | -15.22 |
| Correlation (SPY) | -11.8% | 0.6% |
| 1M | 2M | 3M | 6M | 1Y | 3Y | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Beta | -0.99 | -1.11 | 0.13 | -0.48 | 0.05 | 0.44 |
| Up Beta | -1.44 | -8.36 | -4.97 | -2.86 | -0.11 | 0.18 |
| Down Beta | -6.66 | -0.12 | 1.55 | 1.17 | 0.51 | 0.73 |
| Up Capture | 198% | -196% | -86% | -53% | -6% | 4% |
| Bmk +ve Days | 11 | 23 | 37 | 72 | 143 | 431 |
| Stock +ve Days | 12 | 19 | 30 | 61 | 117 | 341 |
| Down Capture | 97% | 217% | 203% | -25% | -6% | 94% |
| Bmk -ve Days | 11 | 18 | 27 | 55 | 108 | 320 |
| Stock -ve Days | 10 | 22 | 34 | 65 | 129 | 393 |
[1] Upside and downside betas calculated using positive and negative benchmark daily returns respectively
Based On 1-Year Data
| Annualized Return | Annualized Volatility | Sharpe Ratio | Correlation with KPLT | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KPLT | -20.1% | 98.2% | 0.23 | - |
| Sector ETF (XLK) | 21.5% | 27.4% | 0.69 | -1.3% |
| Equity (SPY) | 14.7% | 19.3% | 0.58 | 0.5% |
| Gold (GLD) | 84.5% | 20.5% | 2.90 | -4.2% |
| Commodities (DBC) | 9.2% | 15.4% | 0.37 | 9.3% |
| Real Estate (VNQ) | 4.0% | 16.5% | 0.06 | 4.3% |
| Bitcoin (BTCUSD) | -14.0% | 39.8% | -0.29 | 5.6% |
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Based On 5-Year Data
| Annualized Return | Annualized Volatility | Sharpe Ratio | Correlation with KPLT | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KPLT | -55.4% | 98.9% | -0.35 | - |
| Sector ETF (XLK) | 18.7% | 24.7% | 0.68 | 17.0% |
| Equity (SPY) | 14.3% | 17.1% | 0.67 | 18.3% |
| Gold (GLD) | 22.1% | 15.7% | 1.14 | 0.9% |
| Commodities (DBC) | 12.0% | 18.7% | 0.52 | 7.1% |
| Real Estate (VNQ) | 5.2% | 18.8% | 0.19 | 16.0% |
| Bitcoin (BTCUSD) | 20.0% | 57.9% | 0.55 | 11.0% |
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Based On 10-Year Data
| Annualized Return | Annualized Volatility | Sharpe Ratio | Correlation with KPLT | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KPLT | -29.7% | 93.0% | -0.20 | - |
| Sector ETF (XLK) | 23.6% | 24.2% | 0.89 | 14.5% |
| Equity (SPY) | 15.8% | 17.9% | 0.76 | 14.9% |
| Gold (GLD) | 16.2% | 14.9% | 0.90 | 1.1% |
| Commodities (DBC) | 8.7% | 17.6% | 0.41 | 7.1% |
| Real Estate (VNQ) | 5.9% | 20.8% | 0.25 | 11.9% |
| Bitcoin (BTCUSD) | 73.4% | 66.6% | 1.12 | 10.7% |
Smart multi-asset allocation framework can stack odds in your favor. Learn How
Earnings Returns History
Expand for More| Forward Returns | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Date | 1D Returns | 5D Returns | 21D Returns |
| 11/12/2025 | -5.1% | -9.3% | 7.4% |
| 8/13/2025 | 1.4% | 14.0% | 58.0% |
| 3/28/2025 | -8.3% | -30.5% | -44.5% |
| 11/6/2024 | -15.4% | -21.7% | -20.5% |
| 8/14/2024 | -17.4% | -31.9% | -35.8% |
| 5/15/2024 | 6.6% | 13.6% | -8.5% |
| 2/1/2024 | 9.5% | 15.4% | 26.1% |
| 11/8/2023 | 4.8% | -7.7% | -8.9% |
| ... | |||
| SUMMARY STATS | |||
| # Positive | 7 | 7 | 5 |
| # Negative | 8 | 8 | 10 |
| Median Positive | 6.2% | 14.0% | 26.1% |
| Median Negative | -8.9% | -19.6% | -19.6% |
| Max Positive | 38.6% | 26.1% | 58.0% |
| Max Negative | -20.8% | -46.5% | -57.4% |
SEC Filings
Expand for More| Report Date | Filing Date | Filing |
|---|---|---|
| 09/30/2025 | 11/12/2025 | 10-Q |
| 06/30/2025 | 08/13/2025 | 10-Q |
| 03/31/2025 | 05/15/2025 | 10-Q |
| 12/31/2024 | 03/28/2025 | 10-K |
| 09/30/2024 | 11/06/2024 | 10-Q |
| 06/30/2024 | 08/14/2024 | 10-Q |
| 03/31/2024 | 05/15/2024 | 10-Q |
| 12/31/2023 | 04/24/2024 | 10-K |
| 09/30/2023 | 11/08/2023 | 10-Q |
| 06/30/2023 | 08/09/2023 | 10-Q |
| 03/31/2023 | 05/11/2023 | 10-Q |
| 12/31/2022 | 03/09/2023 | 10-K |
| 09/30/2022 | 11/09/2022 | 10-Q |
| 06/30/2022 | 08/09/2022 | 10-Q |
| 03/31/2022 | 05/10/2022 | 10-Q |
| 12/31/2021 | 03/15/2022 | 10-K |
Insider Activity
Expand for More| # | Owner | Title | Holding | Action | Filing Date | Price | Shares | Transacted Value | Value of Held Shares | Form |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Thompson, Jane J | Direct | Sell | 10092025 | 10.31 | 800 | 8,248 | 459,156 | Form |
External Quote Links
| Y Finance | Barrons |
| TradingView | Morningstar |
| SeekingAlpha | ValueLine |
| Motley Fool | Robinhood |
| CNBC | Etrade |
| MarketWatch | Unusual Whales |
| YCharts | Perplexity Finance |
| FinViz |
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