Former BL Stores (BIGGQ)
Market Price (8/23/2026): $0 | Market Cap: $-Sector: Consumer Discretionary | Industry: Broadline Retail
Former BL Stores (BIGGQ)
Market Price (8/23/2026): $0Market Cap: $-Sector: Consumer DiscretionaryIndustry: Broadline Retail
Investment Highlights Why It Matters Detailed financial logic regarding cash flow yields vs trend-riding momentum.
Valuation becoming less expensiveP/S 6M Chg %Price/Sales change over 6 months. Declining P/S indicates valuation has become less expensive. is null Attractive yieldDividend Yield is 9223372036854775807% | Weak multi-year price returns2Y Excs Rtn is -138%, 3Y Excs Rtn is -174% | Penny stockMkt Price is 0.0 Not profitable at operating income levelOp Inc LTMOperating Income, Last Twelve Months is -624 Mil, Op Mgn LTMOperating Margin = Operating Income / Revenue Reflects profitability before taxes and before impact of capital structure (interest payments). is -14% Debt is significantNet D/ENet Debt/Equity. Debt net of cash. Negative indicates net cash. Equity is taken as the Market Capitalization is 9223372036854775807% Weak revenue growthRev Chg LTMRevenue Change % Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -9.9%, Rev Chg 3Y AvgRevenue Change % averaged over trailing 3 years is -10.0%, Rev Chg QQuarterly Revenue Change % is -8.1% Not cash flow generativeCFO/Rev LTMCash Flow from Operations / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -5.9%, FCF/Rev LTMFree Cash Flow / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -7.2% Yield minus risk free rate is negativeERPEquity Risk Premium (ERP) = Total Yield - Risk Free Rate, Reflects the premium above risk free assets offered by the investment. is -9223372036854775808% High stock price volatilityVol 12M is 1496% Significant short interestShort Interest Days-to-CoverDTC = (Short Interest Share Quantity) / (Average Daily Trading Volume). Reflects how many days it would take to cover (close out) the short interest based on average volumes. High DTC can signify an increased risk of a short squeeze. is 16.11 Key risksBIGGQ key risks include [1] the potential worthlessness of common shares due to Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, Show more. |
| Valuation becoming less expensiveP/S 6M Chg %Price/Sales change over 6 months. Declining P/S indicates valuation has become less expensive. is null |
| Attractive yieldDividend Yield is 9223372036854775807% |
| Weak multi-year price returns2Y Excs Rtn is -138%, 3Y Excs Rtn is -174% |
| Penny stockMkt Price is 0.0 |
| Not profitable at operating income levelOp Inc LTMOperating Income, Last Twelve Months is -624 Mil, Op Mgn LTMOperating Margin = Operating Income / Revenue Reflects profitability before taxes and before impact of capital structure (interest payments). is -14% |
| Debt is significantNet D/ENet Debt/Equity. Debt net of cash. Negative indicates net cash. Equity is taken as the Market Capitalization is 9223372036854775807% |
| Weak revenue growthRev Chg LTMRevenue Change % Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -9.9%, Rev Chg 3Y AvgRevenue Change % averaged over trailing 3 years is -10.0%, Rev Chg QQuarterly Revenue Change % is -8.1% |
| Not cash flow generativeCFO/Rev LTMCash Flow from Operations / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -5.9%, FCF/Rev LTMFree Cash Flow / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -7.2% |
| Yield minus risk free rate is negativeERPEquity Risk Premium (ERP) = Total Yield - Risk Free Rate, Reflects the premium above risk free assets offered by the investment. is -9223372036854775808% |
| High stock price volatilityVol 12M is 1496% |
| Significant short interestShort Interest Days-to-CoverDTC = (Short Interest Share Quantity) / (Average Daily Trading Volume). Reflects how many days it would take to cover (close out) the short interest based on average volumes. High DTC can signify an increased risk of a short squeeze. is 16.11 |
| Key risksBIGGQ key risks include [1] the potential worthlessness of common shares due to Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, Show more. |
Qualitative Assessment
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Former BL Stores (BIGGQ) stock has lost about 100% since 4/30/2026 because of the following key factors:
1. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Operational Decline.
Former BL Stores, previously known as Big Lots, Inc., filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on September 9, 2024, citing severe financial distress. This action followed a period of sustained operational decline, characterized by decreasing revenue; for instance, the company experienced an 8.15% decrease in revenue for the quarter ending August 3, 2024, and a 13.65% annual decline for the fiscal year ending February 3, 2024. Macroeconomic pressures, including high inflation and elevated interest rates, further constrained consumer discretionary spending, exacerbating the company's financial challenges and contributing to its inability to sustain operations. The stock had already lost 99.56% over 52 weeks and 99.97% over two years by August 21, 2026, demonstrating a prolonged period of severe decline that culminated in the bankruptcy filing.
2. Asset Sale and Corporate Restructuring.
A critical step in the company's wind-down was the sale of substantially all of its assets. On January 3, 2025, Former BL Stores completed the sale of its stores, distribution centers, and intellectual property to Gordon Brothers Retail Partners, LLC. Following this transaction, a portion of the Big Lots brand and a reduced store footprint were acquired by Variety Wholesalers. The company formally acknowledged its changed status by adopting the name "Former BL Stores, Inc." on September 25, 2025, indicating its transition from an operating retailer to a non-operating entity managing its bankruptcy estate.
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Former BL Stores (BIGGQ) stock has lost about 100% since 4/30/2026 because of the following key factors:
1. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Operational Decline.
Former BL Stores, previously known as Big Lots, Inc., filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on September 9, 2024, citing severe financial distress. This action followed a period of sustained operational decline, characterized by decreasing revenue; for instance, the company experienced an 8.15% decrease in revenue for the quarter ending August 3, 2024, and a 13.65% annual decline for the fiscal year ending February 3, 2024. Macroeconomic pressures, including high inflation and elevated interest rates, further constrained consumer discretionary spending, exacerbating the company's financial challenges and contributing to its inability to sustain operations. The stock had already lost 99.56% over 52 weeks and 99.97% over two years by August 21, 2026, demonstrating a prolonged period of severe decline that culminated in the bankruptcy filing.
2. Asset Sale and Corporate Restructuring.
A critical step in the company's wind-down was the sale of substantially all of its assets. On January 3, 2025, Former BL Stores completed the sale of its stores, distribution centers, and intellectual property to Gordon Brothers Retail Partners, LLC. Following this transaction, a portion of the Big Lots brand and a reduced store footprint were acquired by Variety Wholesalers. The company formally acknowledged its changed status by adopting the name "Former BL Stores, Inc." on September 25, 2025, indicating its transition from an operating retailer to a non-operating entity managing its bankruptcy estate.
3. Conversion to Chapter 7 Liquidation and Complete Shareholder Loss.
The definitive reason for the stock's approximately 100% loss since April 30, 2026, was the conversion of its bankruptcy case from Chapter 11 reorganization to Chapter 7 liquidation. This conversion was approved by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court on November 10, 2025. The shift to Chapter 7 meant that the company would cease all operations, and a trustee would be appointed to liquidate remaining assets for distribution to creditors, effectively confirming that common shareholders would receive no proceeds. Former BL Stores explicitly stated in its June Monthly Operating Report, filed on August 18, 2025, that "holders of the Company's common shares will experience a complete loss on their investment". Consequently, by the period since April 30, 2026, the stock was trading at a negligible value, typically around $0.0003 to $0.0004 per share, reflecting its worthlessness.
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Stock Movement Drivers
Fundamental Drivers
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Market Drivers
4/30/2026 to 8/22/2026| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| BIGGQ | -100.0% | |
| Market (SPY) | 6.5% | � |
| Sector (XLY) | -0.3% | � |
Fundamental Drivers
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Market Drivers
1/31/2026 to 8/22/2026| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| BIGGQ | -100.0% | |
| Market (SPY) | 11.0% | � |
| Sector (XLY) | -2.4% | � |
Fundamental Drivers
nullnull
Market Drivers
7/31/2025 to 8/22/2026| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| BIGGQ | -100.0% | |
| Market (SPY) | 22.2% | � |
| Sector (XLY) | 7.2% | � |
Fundamental Drivers
nullnull
Market Drivers
7/31/2023 to 8/22/2026| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| BIGGQ | -100.0% | |
| Market (SPY) | 73.2% | � |
| Sector (XLY) | 38.9% | � |
Price Returns Compared
| 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | Total [1] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Returns | |||||||
| BIGGQ Return | 7% | -66% | -46% | -96% | -100% | 0% | -100% |
| Peers Return | -1% | -5% | 11% | 18% | 26% | -1% | 53% |
| S&P 500 Return | 27% | -19% | 24% | 23% | 16% | 12% | 103% |
Monthly Win Rates [3] | |||||||
| BIGGQ Win Rate | 58% | 33% | 42% | 17% | 33% | 25% | |
| Peers Win Rate | 47% | 47% | 58% | 53% | 62% | 48% | |
| S&P 500 Win Rate | 75% | 42% | 67% | 75% | 67% | 50% | |
Max Drawdowns [4] | |||||||
| BIGGQ Max Drawdown | -42% | -71% | -81% | -99% | -100% | -100% | |
| Peers Max Drawdown | -28% | -38% | -32% | -24% | -20% | -26% | |
| S&P 500 Max Drawdown | -5% | -25% | -10% | -8% | -19% | -9% | |
[1] Cumulative total returns since the beginning of 2021
[2] Peers: OLLI, TJX, ROST, BURL, DG.
[3] Win Rate = % of calendar months in which monthly returns were positive
[4] Max drawdown represents maximum peak-to-trough decline within a year
[5] 2026 data is for the year up to 8/21/2026 (YTD)
How Low Can It Go
| Event | BIGGQ | S&P 500 |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 US Tariff Shock | ||
| % Loss | -99.5% | -18.8% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 19900.0% | 23.1% |
| Time to Breakeven | 50 days | 79 days |
| 2024 Yen Carry Trade Unwind | ||
| % Loss | -13.5% | -7.8% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 15.6% | 8.5% |
| Time to Breakeven | 1 days | 18 days |
| 2020 COVID-19 Crash | ||
| % Loss | -58.5% | -33.7% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 141.2% | 50.9% |
| Time to Breakeven | 44 days | 140 days |
| Q4 2018 Fed Policy Error / Growth Scare | ||
| % Loss | -34.0% | -19.2% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 51.6% | 23.8% |
| Time to Breakeven | 520 days | 105 days |
| 2015-2016 China Devaluation / Global Growth Scare | ||
| % Loss | -15.7% | -12.2% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 18.6% | 13.9% |
| Time to Breakeven | 45 days | 62 days |
| 2014-2016 Oil Price Collapse | ||
| % Loss | -20.6% | -6.8% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 26.0% | 7.3% |
| Time to Breakeven | 48 days | 15 days |
In The Past
Former BL Stores's stock fell -99.5% during the 2025 US Tariff Shock. Such a loss loss requires a 19900.0% gain to breakeven.
Preserve Wealth
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Asset Allocation
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| Event | BIGGQ | S&P 500 |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 US Tariff Shock | ||
| % Loss | -99.5% | -18.8% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 19900.0% | 23.1% |
| Time to Breakeven | 50 days | 79 days |
| 2020 COVID-19 Crash | ||
| % Loss | -58.5% | -33.7% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 141.2% | 50.9% |
| Time to Breakeven | 44 days | 140 days |
| Q4 2018 Fed Policy Error / Growth Scare | ||
| % Loss | -34.0% | -19.2% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 51.6% | 23.8% |
| Time to Breakeven | 520 days | 105 days |
| 2014-2016 Oil Price Collapse | ||
| % Loss | -20.6% | -6.8% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 26.0% | 7.3% |
| Time to Breakeven | 48 days | 15 days |
| 2013 Taper Tantrum | ||
| % Loss | -28.9% | -0.2% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 40.7% | 0.2% |
| Time to Breakeven | 33 days | 1 days |
| 2010 Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis / Flash Crash | ||
| % Loss | -22.8% | -15.4% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 29.5% | 18.2% |
| Time to Breakeven | 234 days | 125 days |
| Summer 2007 Credit Crunch | ||
| % Loss | -22.3% | -8.6% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 28.6% | 9.5% |
| Time to Breakeven | 35 days | 47 days |
In The Past
Former BL Stores's stock fell -99.5% during the 2025 US Tariff Shock. Such a loss loss requires a 19900.0% gain to breakeven.
Preserve Wealth
Limiting losses and compounding gains is essential to preserving wealth.
Asset Allocation
Actively managed asset allocation strategies protect wealth. Learn more.
About Former BL Stores (BIGGQ)
Big Lots, Inc. (symbol: BIGGQ) operates as a prominent home discount retailer primarily serving the United States market. The company engages in the sale of a wide assortment of products, catering to value-conscious consumers through an extensive network of over 1,400 stores across 47 states, augmented by a growing e-commerce platform.
The company's merchandise categories are broad and diverse, designed to meet various household and personal needs. Key offerings include furniture such as upholstery, mattresses, and ready-to-assemble pieces, alongside seasonal items like patio furniture and holiday decorations. Big Lots also provides a comprehensive soft home selection, featuring bedding, bath, window treatments, decorative textiles, home organization solutions, and area rugs.
Further expanding its product range, the company stocks everyday consumables, including health, beauty, and cleaning supplies, as well as an extensive food category encompassing beverages, groceries, snacks, specialty foods, and pet products. Additional departments include hard home goods like small appliances and kitchenware, home maintenance and organization items, toys, and a variety of accessories such as apparel and electronics.
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A discount Walmart or Target, but with a heavier emphasis on home goods, furniture, and seasonal items, often through closeout deals.
Like a HomeGoods or TJ Maxx, but they also sell furniture, groceries, and a wide array of everyday discount items.
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- Furniture: Includes upholstery, mattresses, case goods, and ready-to-assemble items for home furnishing.
- Seasonal Products: Offers items such as patio furniture, gazebos, Christmas decorations, and other holiday-themed goods.
- Soft Home Goods: Comprises bedding, bath products, window treatments, home organization, rugs, and decorative items.
- Food Products: Provides a range of beverages, groceries, candy, snacks, specialty foods, and pet supplies.
- Consumables: Features health, beauty, cosmetics, plastics, paper products, and cleaning chemicals.
- Hard Home Goods: Encompasses small appliances, tabletops, food preparation items, and stationery.
- Home Maintenance & Organization: Offers products designed for home upkeep and organizing spaces.
- Toys: Sells a variety of toys for children.
- Accessories: Includes apparel, electronics, jewelry, and hosiery.
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Big Lots, Inc. (symbol: BIGGQ) primarily sells its products directly to individual consumers through its network of physical stores and its e-commerce platform. As a home discount retailer, it serves a broad customer base. The major categories of customers it serves include:
- Value-seeking consumers: Individuals and families who prioritize affordability and seek discount prices on a wide range of products, including home goods, furniture, food, and everyday essentials.
- Budget-conscious home furnishers and decorators: Customers looking to furnish, decorate, or refresh their living spaces with furniture, soft home items, and decorative accessories at accessible price points.
- Everyday household shoppers: Consumers purchasing consumables such as groceries, health and beauty products, paper goods, and cleaning supplies, often seeking bulk savings or discounted prices on daily necessities.
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Bruce K. Thorn CEO & President
Bruce K. Thorn was appointed Chief Executive Officer and President of Big Lots, Inc. in 2018. Prior to joining Big Lots, he served as President and Chief Operating Officer of Tailored Brands, Inc. from 2017 to 2018. Before Tailored Brands, Mr. Thorn held various executive roles at PetSmart, Inc. starting in 2007, including Executive Vice President, Store Operations, Services and Supply Chain. His career also includes leadership positions at Gap, Inc., Cintas Corp, LESCO, Inc., and The United States Army. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and an M.B.A. from the University of Cincinnati.
Jonathan E. Ramsden Executive Vice President, Chief Financial and Administrative Officer
Jonathan Ramsden currently serves as the Executive Vice President, Chief Financial and Administrative Officer at Big Lots. He has extensive experience in finance and administration, having previously held titles such as Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer at companies like Abercrombie & Fitch and TBWA\Worldwide. Mr. Ramsden also founded Sapperton LLC and serves as an Adjunct Professor at The Ohio State University Fisher College of Business.
Ronald A. Robins Jr. Executive Vice President, Chief Legal & Governance Officer, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary
Ronald A. Robins Jr., also known as Rocky, holds the position of Executive Vice President, Chief Legal & Governance Officer, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary at Big Lots. He has previously served as Senior Vice President, Corporate Secretary and General Counsel.
Margarita Giannantonio Chief Merchandising Officer
Margarita Giannantonio was appointed Chief Merchandising Officer of Big Lots in November 2022. She brings over 30 years of experience in merchandising, sales, marketing, and product development across home, housewares, and apparel categories. Before joining Big Lots, Ms. Giannantonio spent a decade with TJX, which includes brands such as HomeGoods, HomeSense, T.J. Maxx, and Marshalls. Her prior roles include positions at Hudson's Bay Company, Incredible Clothing Company, The House2/Stylekraft Sportswear, and Hugo Boss Canada.
Mike Schlonsky Executive Vice President, Chief Human Resources Officer
Mike Schlonsky is an Executive Vice President, Chief Human Resources Officer at Big Lots. He has also been identified as Executive Vice President of Human Resources & Store Operations.
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- Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Potential Loss for Shareholders: Big Lots, Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in September 2024, and its stock was subsequently delisted from the NYSE, now trading on the OTC Markets under the symbol BIGGQ. This ongoing bankruptcy proceeding indicates severe financial distress, and there is a high likelihood that holders of common shares may experience a complete loss on their investment.
- Persistent Financial Instability and Debt Burden: The company has faced significant financial challenges, including operating losses since 2022, declining revenue, and compression of gross margins. Big Lots has struggled with high levels of debt, a substantial cash burn rate, and difficulties in meeting its credit and term loan obligations, even issuing a "going concern" notice. These underlying financial weaknesses continue to pose a significant risk to the company's ability to successfully reorganize and achieve sustainable profitability.
- Intense Competitive Landscape and Shifting Consumer Spending: Big Lots operates in a highly competitive discount retail sector, vying with major players such as Walmart, Target, Dollar General, and Dollar Tree. The company has also been impacted by a pullback in consumer spending on big-ticket discretionary items, particularly furniture (a significant category for Big Lots), coupled with a growing demand for everyday essentials and a shift towards "deal-driven" or "cost-conscious" shopping. This competitive pressure and evolving consumer behavior make it challenging for Big Lots to maintain sales and profitability.
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The intensifying competition from ultra-discount online retailers that leverage direct-from-manufacturer supply chains to offer significantly lower prices and broader selection across many general merchandise categories, directly challenging Big Lots' traditional discount retail model and its significant physical store footprint.
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- Furniture: The U.S. furniture market was estimated at USD 172.33 billion in 2024 and is expected to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.2% from 2025 to 2033.
- Seasonal Products (Christmas trim): The U.S. Christmas decorative products market size was valued at USD 3.12 billion in 2025 and is projected to reach USD 4.12 billion by 2033, expanding at a CAGR of 3.5% from 2026 to 2033.
- Soft Home (Home Decor): The U.S. home decor market size was valued at USD 191.5 billion in 2025, and it is expected to reach USD 257.0 billion by 2034, exhibiting a CAGR of 3.23% from 2026 to 2034.
- Food (Beverage and Grocery, Candy and Snacks, Specialty Foods, and Pet): The U.S. food & grocery retail market was approximately USD 748.96 billion in 2023, representing over 40.0% of the North American food & grocery retail market. Additionally, the U.S. packaged food & beverage market in 2024 was USD 980.8 billion.
- Consumables (Health, Beauty and Cosmetics, Plastics, Paper, and Chemical): null
- Hard Home (Small Appliances, Tabletops, Food Preparation, and Stationery): null
- Home Maintenance and Organization Products: The U.S. home improvement market was valued at USD 534.57 billion in 2024 and is projected to reach USD 682.40 billion by 2033, growing at a CAGR of 2.75% from 2025 to 2033.
- Toys: The U.S. Toys Market reached USD 40.04 billion in 2024 and is projected to grow to USD 54.25 billion by 2032, at a CAGR of 3.89%.
- Accessories (Apparel, Electronics, Jewelry, and Hosiery): The U.S. fashion accessories market generated a revenue of USD 223.2 billion in 2024 and is expected to reach around USD 477.4 billion by 2034, growing at a CAGR of 7.9% from 2025 to 2034.
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For Big Lots, Inc. (symbol: BIGGQ), the expected drivers of future revenue growth over the next 2-3 years are primarily linked to its ongoing restructuring and revitalization efforts following its Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing and subsequent acquisition.
- Store Reopenings and Expansion: A significant driver of future revenue growth is the planned reopening of 200 to 400 stores under new operational management, with many leases transferred to Variety Wholesalers. These targeted reopenings in various states, including Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, aim to increase the company's accessibility and sales footprint. For instance, 132 stores were slated to reopen in May 2025.
- Increased "Bargain" and "Extreme Bargain" Product Penetration: Big Lots is strategically shifting its product assortment to emphasize "bargains" and "extreme bargains." The goal is to achieve 75% bargain penetration and 50% extreme bargain penetration by the end of 2024, a move designed to boost sales and gross margins by attracting budget-conscious consumers. This focus on value-driven offerings is expected to drive customer traffic and purchase frequency.
- Enhanced Sourcing and Cost Reduction Initiatives ("Project Springboard"): Through initiatives like "Project Springboard," Big Lots is focusing on improving merchandise sourcing and reducing costs by establishing international buying offices in places like China and Vietnam. While directly impacting profitability, these cost reductions enable more competitive pricing strategies, which can attract more customers and drive higher sales volumes, thereby contributing to revenue growth. Project Springboard also targets significant bottom-line benefits, with approximately 40% coming from COGS reduction.
- Improved Gross Margin Rate to Support Competitive Pricing: The company anticipates continued quarterly year-over-year gross margin improvements throughout 2024, driven by operational initiatives, lower markdowns, and benefits from Project Springboard efforts. While not a direct revenue driver, a sustained improvement in gross margin provides Big Lots with greater flexibility to offer competitive pricing and promotional activities, which are crucial for attracting and retaining customers in the discount retail segment and ultimately leading to increased sales.
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Share Repurchases
- Big Lots made significant share repurchases in fiscal year 2021, totaling approximately $446.34 million.
- Share repurchases decreased sharply in fiscal year 2022 to approximately $11.18 million.
- In fiscal year 2023 and the first half of fiscal year 2024 (prior to the September 2024 bankruptcy filing), share repurchases were minimal, totaling approximately $1.59 million and $0.76 million, respectively.
Capital Expenditures
- The full-year capital expenditure guidance for 2024 was expected to be around $60 million or less.
- In Q3 2025, Big Lots invested approximately $9.5 million in capital expenditures.
- Capital expenditures are focused on funding long-term assets and infrastructure, including plans for three new store openings in Q3 2024.
Peer Outperformance in Broadline Retail
| Industry | Names | 1Y med | 3Y med | 5Y med | Top 3 by 5Y |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Education Services | 14 | -15.1% | 103.6% | 70.6% | LINC 321% · CVSA 259% · UTI 231% |
| Homebuilding | 18 | -4.9% | 32.7% | 55.2% | GRBK 190% · TOL 161% · PHM 158% |
| Hotels, Resorts & Cruise Lines | 22 | 17.7% | 53.5% | 16.5% | RCL 274% · MAR 177% · HLT 169% |
| Automotive Retail | 18 | -13.8% | 2.5% | 14.1% | MUSA 278% · PAG 186% · ORLY 122% |
| Specialty Stores | 7 | -5.5% | 33.8% | 10.0% | DKS 91% · ASO 25% · SIG 23% |
| Home Improvement Retail | 5 | -16.5% | 1.0% | 8.5% | HD 16% · LOW 16% · HVT 8% |
| Casinos & Gaming | 20 | -7.2% | -24.1% | 2.4% | BRAG 1014% · MCRI 112% · RSI 95% |
| Specialized Consumer Services | 10 | -11.3% | 15.8% | -5.3% | HRB 150% · FTDR 97% · SCI 43% |
| Restaurants | 34 | -7.4% | -5.4% | -7.2% | EAT 370% · CAKE 196% · RAVE 159% |
| Distributors | 4 | -8.0% | -24.6% | -7.6% | ARMK 160% · GPC 26% · LKQ -41% |
| Home Furnishings | 4 | -2.8% | 30.6% | -12.3% | SGI 58% · LZB 8% · MHK -32% |
| Footwear | 9 | 58.9% | 44.6% | -14.5% | WEYS 156% · DECK 27% · SHOO 26% |
| Automotive Parts & Equipment | 38 | -9.1% | -5.3% | -31.9% | MOD 1423% · GTX 275% · STRT 106% |
| Leisure Products | 13 | -4.0% | -10.0% | -32.5% | GOLF 86% · HAS 18% · MCFT 1% |
| Apparel, Accessories & Luxury Goods | 27 | 3.5% | -2.0% | -35.2% | TPR 250% · RL 248% · ELA 229% |
| Apparel Retail | 25 | -1.4% | 3.7% | -38.5% | DXLG 187% · ANF 180% · ROST 103% |
| Leisure Facilities | 12 | -15.2% | -8.6% | -39.7% | OSW 177% · JAKK 115% · ESCA 12% |
| Household Appliances | 18 | 7.7% | 37.4% | -40.6% | KEQU 176% · FLXS 147% · HBB 122% |
| Broadline Retail ← | 15 | 5.9% | 12.5% | -50.4% | DDS 296% · AMZN 58% · EBAY 55% |
| Computer & Electronics Retail | 3 | -19.2% | 7.8% | -55.8% | BBY -4% · GME -56% · UPBD -61% |
| Automobile Manufacturers | 8 | -70.4% | -67.2% | -68.8% | GM 90% · F 54% · TSLA 54% |
| Consumer Electronics | 11 | -18.5% | -21.6% | -75.5% | AXIL 2348% · GRMN 91% · TBCH -54% |
| Other Specialty Retail | 18 | -28.1% | -44.1% | -77.8% | BBW 212% · TLF 105% · WINA 95% |
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Peer Comparisons
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Financials
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| Mkt Price | 131.97 |
| Mkt Cap | 23.8 |
| Rev LTM | 17,848 |
| Op Inc LTM | 1,570 |
| FCF LTM | 1,285 |
| FCF 3Y Avg | 957 |
| CFO LTM | 2,387 |
| CFO 3Y Avg | 1,904 |
Growth & Margins
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| Rev Chg LTM | 9.3% |
| Rev Chg 3Y Avg | 7.6% |
| Rev Chg Q | 11.7% |
| QoQ Delta Rev Chg LTM | 2.5% |
| Op Inc Chg LTM | 19.9% |
| Op Inc Chg 3Y Avg | 14.6% |
| Op Mgn LTM | 9.8% |
| Op Mgn 3Y Avg | 9.0% |
| QoQ Delta Op Mgn LTM | 0.1% |
| CFO/Rev LTM | 11.3% |
| CFO/Rev 3Y Avg | 10.2% |
| FCF/Rev LTM | 6.4% |
| FCF/Rev 3Y Avg | 5.1% |
Segment Financials
Revenue by Segment| $ Mil | 2024 | 2023 | 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Furniture | 1,180 | 1,279 | 1,684 |
| Consumables | 860 | 629 | 666 |
| Seasonal | 758 | 961 | 954 |
| Soft Home | 754 | 678 | 823 |
| Food | 681 | 736 | 746 |
| Hard Home & Other | 488 | ||
| Apparel, Electronics, & Other | 590 | 602 | |
| Hard Home | 594 | 675 | |
| Total | 4,722 | 5,468 | 6,151 |
| $ Mil | 2014 | 2013 | 2012 | 2000 | 1999 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 230 | 312 | 358 | ||
| Canada | -39 | -14 | -12 | ||
| Closeout | 170 | 151 | |||
| KBkids.com | -70 | ||||
| Other and corporate | -1 | 6 | |||
| Toys | 70 | 46 | |||
| Total | 190 | 298 | 346 | 170 | 204 |
| $ Mil | 2014 | 2013 | 2012 | 2000 | 1999 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 1,709 | 1,681 | 1,586 | ||
| Canada | 30 | 73 | 55 | ||
| Closeout | 83 | 1,252 | |||
| KBkids.com | 7 | ||||
| Other and corporate | 26 | 30 | |||
| Toys | 57 | 760 | |||
| Total | 1,740 | 1,754 | 1,641 | 173 | 2,043 |
Price Behavior
| Market Price | $0.00 | |
| Market Cap ($ Bil) | 0.0 | |
| First Trading Date | 06/20/1985 | |
| Distance from 52W High | -100.0% | |
| 50 Days | 200 Days | |
| DMA Price | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| DMA Trend | down | down |
| Distance from DMA | -100.0% | -100.0% |
| 3M | 1YR | |
| Volatility | � | � |
| Downside Capture | � | � |
| Upside Capture | � | � |
| Correlation (SPY) | � | � |
| 1M | 2M | 3M | 6M | 1Y | 3Y | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Beta | � | � | � | � | � | � |
| Up Beta | � | � | � | � | � | � |
| Down Beta | � | � | � | � | � | � |
| Up Capture | ∞% | ∞% | ∞% | � | � | � |
| Bmk +ve Days | 11 | 22 | 35 | 67 | 138 | 427 |
| Stock +ve Days | 5 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 29 | 224 |
| Down Capture | � | � | � | � | � | � |
| Bmk -ve Days | 11 | 21 | 28 | 59 | 114 | 326 |
| Stock -ve Days | 4 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 30 | 294 |
[1] Upside and downside betas calculated using positive and negative benchmark daily returns respectively
Based On 1-Year Data
| Annualized Return | Annualized Volatility | Sharpe Ratio | Correlation with BIGGQ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BIGGQ | -100.0% | 601.1% | -0.88 | - |
| Sector ETF (XLY) | 4.3% | 19.6% | 0.10 | 7.9% |
| Equity (SPY) | 21.1% | 12.9% | 1.22 | 4.7% |
| Gold (GLD) | 37.5% | 28.8% | 1.10 | -3.6% |
| Commodities (DBC) | 43.2% | 20.2% | 1.66 | -3.1% |
| Real Estate (VNQ) | 12.9% | 13.8% | 0.64 | 9.2% |
| Bitcoin (BTCUSD) | -31.6% | 44.1% | -0.73 | 1.4% |
Smart multi-asset allocation framework can stack odds in your favor. Learn How
Based On 5-Year Data
| Annualized Return | Annualized Volatility | Sharpe Ratio | Correlation with BIGGQ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BIGGQ | -100.0% | 652.5% | 0.71 | - |
| Sector ETF (XLY) | 6.2% | 24.1% | 0.22 | 4.6% |
| Equity (SPY) | 12.9% | 17.2% | 0.57 | 1.1% |
| Gold (GLD) | 20.6% | 18.6% | 0.90 | 0.8% |
| Commodities (DBC) | 10.4% | 19.6% | 0.41 | 0.9% |
| Real Estate (VNQ) | 2.3% | 18.9% | 0.02 | 6.3% |
| Bitcoin (BTCUSD) | 10.4% | 52.8% | 0.38 | -0.1% |
Smart multi-asset allocation framework can stack odds in your favor. Learn How
Based On 10-Year Data
| Annualized Return | Annualized Volatility | Sharpe Ratio | Correlation with BIGGQ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BIGGQ | -100.0% | 451.0% | 0.51 | - |
| Sector ETF (XLY) | 12.3% | 22.2% | 0.51 | 6.0% |
| Equity (SPY) | 15.2% | 17.9% | 0.72 | 3.4% |
| Gold (GLD) | 12.7% | 16.2% | 0.64 | 1.2% |
| Commodities (DBC) | 8.0% | 18.0% | 0.36 | 1.7% |
| Real Estate (VNQ) | 5.0% | 20.7% | 0.20 | 6.5% |
| Bitcoin (BTCUSD) | 63.1% | 66.1% | 1.03 | 0.7% |
Smart multi-asset allocation framework can stack odds in your favor. Learn How
Earnings Returns History
Updated 6/5/2026| Forward Returns | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Date | 1D Returns | 5D Returns | 21D Returns |
| 6/11/2024 | 5.3% | -16.8% | -54.0% |
| 3/12/2024 | 0.0% | -8.3% | -8.5% |
| 12/5/2023 | 4.5% | 13.7% | 29.6% |
| 8/31/2023 | 3.2% | -9.0% | -24.0% |
| 5/30/2023 | -7.0% | 38.5% | 62.2% |
| 3/6/2023 | -0.9% | -4.7% | -18.3% |
| 12/5/2022 | -1.9% | -3.9% | -6.7% |
| 9/1/2022 | -0.4% | 8.3% | -21.3% |
| ... | |||
| SUMMARY STATS | |||
| # Positive | 9 | 6 | 7 |
| # Negative | 8 | 11 | 10 |
| Median Positive | 3.1% | 11.0% | 9.7% |
| Median Negative | -1.1% | -4.7% | -11.8% |
| Max Positive | 5.3% | 38.5% | 62.2% |
| Max Negative | -7.6% | -16.8% | -54.0% |
| Forward Returns | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Date | 1D Returns | 5D Returns | 21D Returns |
| 6/11/2024 | 5.3% | -16.8% | -54.0% |
| 3/12/2024 | 0.0% | -8.3% | -8.5% |
| 12/5/2023 | 4.5% | 13.7% | 29.6% |
| 8/31/2023 | 3.2% | -9.0% | -24.0% |
| 5/30/2023 | -7.0% | 38.5% | 62.2% |
| 3/6/2023 | -0.9% | -4.7% | -18.3% |
| 12/5/2022 | -1.9% | -3.9% | -6.7% |
| 9/1/2022 | -0.4% | 8.3% | -21.3% |
| 5/31/2022 | -7.6% | -1.2% | -13.3% |
| 3/7/2022 | -0.2% | -11.7% | -3.3% |
| 12/6/2021 | 2.5% | 0.3% | 9.7% |
| 8/31/2021 | -0.4% | -5.2% | -10.3% |
| 6/1/2021 | 3.1% | 16.6% | 6.9% |
| 3/9/2021 | -1.3% | 2.1% | 3.0% |
| 12/7/2020 | 1.5% | -1.3% | 0.9% |
| 9/1/2020 | 0.5% | -3.2% | -6.0% |
| 6/2/2020 | 3.3% | -2.7% | 10.1% |
| SUMMARY STATS | |||
| # Positive | 9 | 6 | 7 |
| # Negative | 8 | 11 | 10 |
| Median Positive | 3.1% | 11.0% | 9.7% |
| Median Negative | -1.1% | -4.7% | -11.8% |
| Max Positive | 5.3% | 38.5% | 62.2% |
| Max Negative | -7.6% | -16.8% | -54.0% |
SEC Filings
Expand for More| Report Date | Filing Date | Filing |
|---|---|---|
| 07/31/2024 | 09/12/2024 | 10-Q |
| 04/30/2024 | 06/13/2024 | 10-Q |
| 01/31/2024 | 04/18/2024 | 10-K |
| 10/31/2023 | 12/06/2023 | 10-Q |
| 07/31/2023 | 09/06/2023 | 10-Q |
| 04/30/2023 | 06/07/2023 | 10-Q |
| 01/31/2023 | 03/28/2023 | 10-K |
| 10/31/2022 | 12/07/2022 | 10-Q |
| 07/31/2022 | 09/07/2022 | 10-Q |
| 04/30/2022 | 06/08/2022 | 10-Q |
| 01/31/2022 | 03/29/2022 | 10-K |
| 10/31/2021 | 12/08/2021 | 10-Q |
| 07/31/2021 | 09/08/2021 | 10-Q |
| 04/30/2021 | 06/09/2021 | 10-Q |
| 01/31/2021 | 03/30/2021 | 10-K |
| 10/31/2020 | 12/09/2020 | 10-Q |
| Report Date | Filing Date | Filing |
|---|---|---|
| 07/31/2024 | 09/12/2024 | 10-Q |
| 04/30/2024 | 06/13/2024 | 10-Q |
| 01/31/2024 | 04/18/2024 | 10-K |
| 10/31/2023 | 12/06/2023 | 10-Q |
| 07/31/2023 | 09/06/2023 | 10-Q |
| 04/30/2023 | 06/07/2023 | 10-Q |
| 01/31/2023 | 03/28/2023 | 10-K |
| 10/31/2022 | 12/07/2022 | 10-Q |
| 07/31/2022 | 09/07/2022 | 10-Q |
| 04/30/2022 | 06/08/2022 | 10-Q |
| 01/31/2022 | 03/29/2022 | 10-K |
| 10/31/2021 | 12/08/2021 | 10-Q |
| 07/31/2021 | 09/08/2021 | 10-Q |
| 04/30/2021 | 06/09/2021 | 10-Q |
| 01/31/2021 | 03/30/2021 | 10-K |
| 10/31/2020 | 12/09/2020 | 10-Q |
| 07/31/2020 | 09/09/2020 | 10-Q |
| 04/30/2020 | 06/10/2020 | 10-Q |
| 01/31/2020 | 03/31/2020 | 10-K |
| 10/31/2019 | 12/11/2019 | 10-Q |
| 07/31/2019 | 09/11/2019 | 10-Q |
| 04/30/2019 | 06/12/2019 | 10-Q |
| 01/31/2019 | 04/02/2019 | 10-K |
| 10/31/2018 | 12/12/2018 | 10-Q |
| 07/31/2018 | 09/12/2018 | 10-Q |
| 04/30/2018 | 06/13/2018 | 10-Q |
| 01/31/2018 | 04/03/2018 | 10-K |
| 10/31/2017 | 12/06/2017 | 10-Q |
Industry Resources
| Consumer Discretionary Resources |
| Retail Dive |
| Business of Fashion (BoF) |
| WWD (Women's Wear Daily) |
| National Retail Federation (NRF) |
| McKinsey & Company - Consumer |
| Mintel Consumer Trends |
| Broadline Retail Resources |
| Chain Store Age |
| RetailWire |
External Quote Links
| Y Finance | Barrons |
| TradingView | Morningstar |
| SeekingAlpha | ValueLine |
| Motley Fool | Robinhood |
| CNBC | Etrade |
| MarketWatch | Unusual Whales |
| YCharts | Perplexity Finance |
| FinViz |
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