Grocery Outlet (GO)
Market Price (12/25/2025): $10.25 | Market Cap: $1.0 BilSector: Consumer Staples | Industry: Food Retail
Grocery Outlet (GO)
Market Price (12/25/2025): $10.25Market Cap: $1.0 BilSector: Consumer StaplesIndustry: Food Retail
Investment Highlights Why It Matters Detailed financial logic regarding cash flow yields vs trend-riding momentum.
| Megatrend and thematic driversMegatrends include Health & Wellness Trends, Sustainable Resource Management, and Value-Oriented Consumerism. Themes include Organic & Natural Products, Show more. | Weak multi-year price returns2Y Excs Rtn is -110%, 3Y Excs Rtn is -146% | Debt is significantNet D/ENet Debt/Equity. Debt net of cash. Negative indicates net cash. Equity is taken as the Market Capitalization is 175% |
| Meaningful short interestShort Interest Days-to-CoverDTC = (Short Interest Share Quantity) / (Average Daily Trading Volume). Reflects how many days it would take to cover (close out) the short interest based on average volumes. High DTC can signify an increased risk of a short squeeze. is 10.4 | Expensive valuation multiplesP/EBITPrice/EBIT or Price/(Operating Income) ratio is 35x | |
| Not cash flow generativeFCF/Rev LTMFree Cash Flow / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -1.1% | ||
| Yield minus risk free rate is negativeERPEquity Risk Premium (ERP) = Total Yield - Risk Free Rate, Reflects the premium above risk free assets offered by the investment. is -4.6% | ||
| Significant short interestShort Interest % of Basic SharesShort Interest % of Basic Shares = (Short Interest Quantity) / (Basic Shares Outstanding). A high fraction of short interest can indicate potential risk of a short squeeze. is 24% | ||
| Key risksGO key risks include [1] significant operational disruptions and a class-action lawsuit stemming from a problematic technology platform transition, Show more. |
| Megatrend and thematic driversMegatrends include Health & Wellness Trends, Sustainable Resource Management, and Value-Oriented Consumerism. Themes include Organic & Natural Products, Show more. |
| Weak multi-year price returns2Y Excs Rtn is -110%, 3Y Excs Rtn is -146% |
| Meaningful short interestShort Interest Days-to-CoverDTC = (Short Interest Share Quantity) / (Average Daily Trading Volume). Reflects how many days it would take to cover (close out) the short interest based on average volumes. High DTC can signify an increased risk of a short squeeze. is 10.4 |
| Debt is significantNet D/ENet Debt/Equity. Debt net of cash. Negative indicates net cash. Equity is taken as the Market Capitalization is 175% |
| Expensive valuation multiplesP/EBITPrice/EBIT or Price/(Operating Income) ratio is 35x |
| Not cash flow generativeFCF/Rev LTMFree Cash Flow / Revenue (Sales), Last Twelve Months (LTM) is -1.1% |
| Yield minus risk free rate is negativeERPEquity Risk Premium (ERP) = Total Yield - Risk Free Rate, Reflects the premium above risk free assets offered by the investment. is -4.6% |
| Significant short interestShort Interest % of Basic SharesShort Interest % of Basic Shares = (Short Interest Quantity) / (Basic Shares Outstanding). A high fraction of short interest can indicate potential risk of a short squeeze. is 24% |
| Key risksGO key risks include [1] significant operational disruptions and a class-action lawsuit stemming from a problematic technology platform transition, Show more. |
Why The Stock Moved
Qualitative Assessment
AI Analysis | Feedback
Here are the key points for why Grocery Outlet (GO) stock moved by -43.3% from approximately August 31, 2025, to today:1. Weak November Same-Store Sales and Decline in EBT Payments: Grocery Outlet reported weaker November same-store sales, which declined by approximately 1.2%, and an 8.2% drop in Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) payment sales, indicating significant pressure on its value-focused customer base and softening demand among lower-income shoppers.
2. Downward Revision of FY2025 Guidance: The company revised its fiscal year 2025 comparable store sales expectations downward to the low end of the 0.6%-0.9% range and adjusted its earnings per share guidance to the lower end of $0.78-$0.80, signaling a more cautious outlook from management.
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Stock Movement Drivers
Fundamental Drivers
The -34.0% change in GO stock from 9/24/2025 to 12/24/2025 was primarily driven by a -34.8% change in the company's P/S Multiple.| 9242025 | 12242025 | Change | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Price ($) | 15.55 | 10.26 | -34.02% |
| Change Contribution By | LTM | LTM | |
| Total Revenues ($ Mil) | 4511.38 | 4571.35 | 1.33% |
| P/S Multiple | 0.34 | 0.22 | -34.83% |
| Shares Outstanding (Mil) | 98.08 | 98.16 | -0.08% |
| Cumulative Contribution | -34.02% |
Market Drivers
9/24/2025 to 12/24/2025| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| GO | -34.0% | |
| Market (SPY) | 4.4% | 14.7% |
| Sector (XLP) | -0.5% | 29.9% |
Fundamental Drivers
The -20.9% change in GO stock from 6/25/2025 to 12/24/2025 was primarily driven by a -22.3% change in the company's P/S Multiple.| 6252025 | 12242025 | Change | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Price ($) | 12.97 | 10.26 | -20.89% |
| Change Contribution By | LTM | LTM | |
| Total Revenues ($ Mil) | 4460.12 | 4571.35 | 2.49% |
| P/S Multiple | 0.28 | 0.22 | -22.31% |
| Shares Outstanding (Mil) | 97.52 | 98.16 | -0.66% |
| Cumulative Contribution | -20.90% |
Market Drivers
6/25/2025 to 12/24/2025| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| GO | -20.9% | |
| Market (SPY) | 14.0% | 11.2% |
| Sector (XLP) | -2.0% | 34.6% |
Fundamental Drivers
The -34.9% change in GO stock from 12/24/2024 to 12/24/2025 was primarily driven by a -39.4% change in the company's P/S Multiple.| 12242024 | 12242025 | Change | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Price ($) | 15.76 | 10.26 | -34.90% |
| Change Contribution By | LTM | LTM | |
| Total Revenues ($ Mil) | 4263.47 | 4571.35 | 7.22% |
| P/S Multiple | 0.36 | 0.22 | -39.41% |
| Shares Outstanding (Mil) | 98.36 | 98.16 | 0.20% |
| Cumulative Contribution | -34.90% |
Market Drivers
12/24/2024 to 12/24/2025| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| GO | -34.9% | |
| Market (SPY) | 15.8% | 2.7% |
| Sector (XLP) | 0.2% | 34.2% |
Fundamental Drivers
The -65.5% change in GO stock from 12/25/2022 to 12/24/2025 was primarily driven by a -73.8% change in the company's P/S Multiple.| 12252022 | 12242025 | Change | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Price ($) | 29.71 | 10.26 | -65.47% |
| Change Contribution By | LTM | LTM | |
| Total Revenues ($ Mil) | 3429.97 | 4571.35 | 33.28% |
| P/S Multiple | 0.84 | 0.22 | -73.79% |
| Shares Outstanding (Mil) | 97.06 | 98.16 | -1.14% |
| Cumulative Contribution | -65.47% |
Market Drivers
12/25/2023 to 12/24/2025| Return | Correlation | |
|---|---|---|
| GO | -62.5% | |
| Market (SPY) | 48.9% | 6.5% |
| Sector (XLP) | 14.9% | 31.2% |
Price Returns Compared
| 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | Total [1] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Returns | |||||||
| GO Return | 21% | -28% | 3% | -8% | -42% | -35% | -69% |
| Peers Return | 35% | 27% | -5% | 14% | 6% | 28% | 151% |
| S&P 500 Return | 16% | 27% | -19% | 24% | 23% | 18% | 115% |
Monthly Win Rates [3] | |||||||
| GO Win Rate | 58% | 50% | 58% | 50% | 33% | 42% | |
| Peers Win Rate | 55% | 62% | 50% | 63% | 42% | 58% | |
| S&P 500 Win Rate | 58% | 75% | 42% | 67% | 75% | 73% | |
Max Drawdowns [4] | |||||||
| GO Max Drawdown | -10% | -46% | -14% | -10% | -48% | -37% | |
| Peers Max Drawdown | -22% | -20% | -21% | -19% | -24% | -9% | |
| S&P 500 Max Drawdown | -31% | -1% | -25% | -1% | -2% | -15% | |
[1] Cumulative total returns since the beginning of 2020
[2] Peers: OLLI, DG, DLTR, COST, BJ. See GO Returns vs. Peers.
[3] Win Rate = % of calendar months in which monthly returns were positive
[4] Max drawdown represents maximum peak-to-trough decline within a year
[5] 2025 data is for the year up to 12/24/2025 (YTD)
How Low Can It Go
| Event | GO | S&P 500 |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 Inflation Shock | ||
| % Loss | -53.9% | -25.4% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 117.1% | 34.1% |
| Time to Breakeven | Not Fully Recovered days | 464 days |
| 2020 Covid Pandemic | ||
| % Loss | -21.1% | -33.9% |
| % Gain to Breakeven | 26.7% | 51.3% |
| Time to Breakeven | Not Fully Recovered days | 148 days |
Compare to KR, DG, DT, DNUT, CASY
In The Past
Grocery Outlet's stock fell -53.9% during the 2022 Inflation Shock from a high on 1/27/2021. A -53.9% loss requires a 117.1% gain to breakeven.
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AI Analysis | Feedback
TJ Maxx for groceries.
A grocery store version of TJ Maxx or Ross Dress for Less.
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- Groceries: A comprehensive range of food items, including packaged goods, fresh produce, dairy, meat, and frozen foods.
- Household Goods: Essential non-food items for the home, such as cleaning supplies, paper products, and pet food.
- Health & Beauty Aids: Personal care products, cosmetics, and over-the-counter medications.
- Wine & Beer: A selection of alcoholic beverages, typically offered at discounted prices where legally permitted.
AI Analysis | Feedback
Grocery Outlet (symbol: GO) sells primarily to individuals, operating a chain of discount grocery stores that serve consumers directly.
The company serves the following categories of individual customers:
- Value-conscious Shoppers: These customers prioritize saving money on their grocery bills. They are attracted to Grocery Outlet's deep discounts on everyday essentials, often purchasing private label products or well-known brands at significantly lower prices than traditional supermarkets.
- "Treasure Hunters" / Opportunistic Shoppers: This category includes shoppers who enjoy the dynamic and often unpredictable inventory at Grocery Outlet. They seek out unique deals, premium brands at discount prices, or specialty items that appear temporarily due to Grocery Outlet's opportunistic buying model. They appreciate the novelty and excitement of finding unexpected bargains.
- Budget-conscious Families and Households: Families and households looking to maximize their grocery budget for a larger group often frequent Grocery Outlet. They leverage the store's low prices to stretch their purchasing power further, ensuring they can provide for their household without overspending on groceries.
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Jason Potter, President and Chief Executive Officer
Jason Potter was appointed President and Chief Executive Officer of Grocery Outlet, effective February 3, 2025. He brings over 30 years of grocery retail experience to the role, having most recently served as CEO of The Fresh Market, where he oversaw its transformation.
Christopher Miller, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
Christopher Miller was appointed Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, effective January 6, 2025. He previously served as CFO of Shamrock Foods Company for nearly two years. Prior to that, he spent over 15 years at Core-Mark Holding Co., where he held various financial and leadership roles, including Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, and Vice President and Chief Accounting Officer. Core-Mark Holding Co. was acquired by Performance Food Group Company in September 2021. Miller's background also includes finance and accounting roles at Cost Plus World Market, Levi Strauss & Co., and Hermes.
Eric Lindberg, Chairman of the Board
Eric Lindberg serves as the Chairman of the Board for Grocery Outlet. He previously served as Interim President and Chief Executive Officer from October 2024 until Jason Potter's appointment on February 3, 2025, and is a former CEO of the company.
Ramesh Chikkala, Chief Operations Officer; Executive Vice President
Ramesh Chikkala was appointed as Grocery Outlet's first Chief Operations Officer in January 2024. He is a former Walmart executive.
Pamela Burke, Chief Stores Officer
Pamela Burke serves as the Chief Stores Officer for Grocery Outlet. She has also been identified as Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and General Counsel.
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The key risks to Grocery Outlet's (GO) business include:
- Macroeconomic Uncertainties and Shifting Consumer Behavior: Grocery Outlet faces significant risks from macroeconomic factors such as inflation, rising operational costs, and evolving consumer spending habits. These conditions have led to smaller basket sizes and a potential shift by consumers towards house brands or away from discounted name brands, directly impacting comparable store sales and overall profitability. The company has adjusted its comparable store sales growth expectations downward due to these uncertainties.
- Operational Challenges and Technology Transition Issues: The company has experienced substantial disruptions stemming from a problematic technology platform transition that began in mid-2023. This transition has resulted in operational inefficiencies, reduced gross margins, and dampened comparable store sales growth. Analysts have raised concerns about the timeline for resolving these execution and systems integration issues. Furthermore, Grocery Outlet is facing a class-action lawsuit alleging that it misled investors about the financial impact of these technological problems.
- Risks Related to its Unique Business Model, Sourcing, and Competition: Grocery Outlet's business model, which relies on opportunistically sourcing discounted, often name-brand products, carries inherent risks. This approach can lead to inconsistent product availability, potentially frustrating customers who expect specific items. The company also faces intense competition from other discount retailers like ALDI and Lidl, as well as larger grocery chains, which challenges its ability to maintain its value perception and market share. Additionally, the company's debt has increased following recent acquisitions.
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The expansion of direct-to-consumer (DTC) and subscription models for discounted and opportunistic food products poses a clear emerging threat. Companies such as Imperfect Foods and Misfits Market directly compete with Grocery Outlet's core opportunistic buying strategy by offering 'ugly' produce, surplus inventory, and closeout items at discounted prices. These DTC models leverage e-commerce and direct home delivery, providing a convenient alternative for value-conscious consumers who are also interested in sustainability and reducing food waste. As these services scale, expand their product ranges, and increase their geographical reach, they offer a direct-to-door channel for accessing discounted groceries, potentially diverting a significant segment of Grocery Outlet's target customer base that might otherwise rely on the in-store 'treasure hunt' experience.
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Expected Drivers of Future Revenue Growth for Grocery Outlet (GO)
- New Store Expansion: Grocery Outlet continues to prioritize opening new stores. The company has been expanding its store footprint at a rapid pace, averaging 10.8% annual growth over the past two years, significantly faster than the broader consumer retail sector. In 2025, Grocery Outlet plans to open 33-35 net new stores, a key component of its ongoing expansion strategy. This strategy allows the company to capitalize on "white space" to build new locations and scale into a mid-sized business.
- Store Refresh Program: The company is accelerating its store refresh program, which has demonstrated positive outcomes. Pilot stores undergoing this refresh have shown a "mid-single-digit comp lift". Management views the scaling of this program, which focuses on merchandising, assortment, and in-store messaging, as the primary driver for accelerating comparable sales growth in the coming year, with plans to complete 150 store refreshes by the end of 2026.
- Enhancing Comparable Store Sales (Same-Store Sales) Growth: While recent comparable store sales growth has been inconsistent, Grocery Outlet is implementing initiatives to improve this metric. Efforts include enhancing in-stock positioning for high-velocity items, utilizing a real-time order guide that has delivered a 200-basis-point comparable sales lift in test stores, and deploying a new forecasting tool for meat and produce, which has resulted in double-digit sales increases in pilot locations. The company has also refined its "Known Value Item" pricing strategy to ensure 15-20% basket savings compared to discount peers.
- Leveraging its Differentiated Value Proposition: Grocery Outlet's unique off-price business model, offering 40-70% price discounts on an ever-changing assortment of approximately 5,000 SKUs, remains a core competitive advantage. This value-driven approach, characterized by opportunistic sourcing of quality name-brand products and locally operated stores, positions the company to attract customers seeking significant savings, especially in dynamic economic environments.
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Share Repurchases
- Grocery Outlet initiated a share repurchase program, effective November 5, 2021, authorizing the company to repurchase up to $100.0 million of its common stock.
- In the fourth quarter of fiscal 2024, the Board of Directors approved a new share repurchase program.
Share Issuance
- No significant share issuances by Grocery Outlet to raise new capital were explicitly identified within the last 3-5 years.
Inbound Investments
- No large inbound investments by strategic partners or private equity firms into Grocery Outlet were explicitly identified within the last 3-5 years.
Outbound Investments
- Grocery Outlet acquired United Grocery Outlet, adding approximately 40 stores in the Southeast for a price of $62 million. This acquisition led to an increase in long-term debt by $182.4 million in net debt at the time.
Capital Expenditures
- Capital expenditures for the first quarter of fiscal 2025 were $65.3 million (before tenant improvement allowances), driven primarily by increased supply chain investments and additional new store openings.
- For fiscal year 2025, total capital spending is expected to be approximately $210 million, with a target of opening between 33 and 35 net new stores.
- A meaningful reduction in capital expenditures is anticipated for 2026, even with plans to complete 150 store refreshes by the end of 2026, focusing on layout improvements, expanding core assortment, and enhancing in-store messaging.
Latest Trefis Analyses
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|---|---|
| ARTICLES |
Trade Ideas
Select ideas related to GO. For more, see Trefis Trade Ideas.
| Date | Ticker | Company | Category | Trade Strategy | 6M Fwd Rtn | 12M Fwd Rtn | 12M Max DD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11302025 | BF-B | Brown-Forman | Dip Buy | DB | P/E OPMDip Buy with Low PE and High MarginBuying dips for companies with tame PE and meaningfully high operating margin | -6.5% | -6.5% | -7.4% |
| 11302025 | CPB | Campbell's | Dip Buy | DB | P/E OPMDip Buy with Low PE and High MarginBuying dips for companies with tame PE and meaningfully high operating margin | -8.1% | -8.1% | -9.2% |
| 11212025 | ENR | Energizer | Dip Buy | DB | FCF Yield | Low D/EDip Buy with High Free Cash Flow YieldBuying dips for companies with significant free cash flow yield (FCF / Market Cap) and reasonable debt / market cap | 13.2% | 13.2% | -5.3% |
| 11212025 | FLO | Flowers Foods | Dip Buy | DB | FCF Yield | Low D/EDip Buy with High Free Cash Flow YieldBuying dips for companies with significant free cash flow yield (FCF / Market Cap) and reasonable debt / market cap | 5.2% | 5.2% | -1.6% |
| 11142025 | CLX | Clorox | Dip Buy | DB | FCFY OPMDip Buy with High FCF Yield and High MarginBuying dips for companies with high FCF yield and meaningfully high operating margin | -5.3% | -5.3% | -6.0% |
Research & Analysis
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Peer Comparisons for Grocery Outlet
| Peers to compare with: |
Financials
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| Mkt Price | 116.60 |
| Mkt Cap | 18.6 |
| Rev LTM | 20,061 |
| Op Inc LTM | 1,169 |
| FCF LTM | 731 |
| FCF 3Y Avg | 650 |
| CFO LTM | 1,644 |
| CFO 3Y Avg | 1,694 |
Growth & Margins
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| Rev Chg LTM | 7.8% |
| Rev Chg 3Y Avg | 8.4% |
| Rev Chg Q | 6.9% |
| QoQ Delta Rev Chg LTM | 1.6% |
| Op Mgn LTM | 4.2% |
| Op Mgn 3Y Avg | 4.8% |
| QoQ Delta Op Mgn LTM | -0.1% |
| CFO/Rev LTM | 6.9% |
| CFO/Rev 3Y Avg | 6.1% |
| FCF/Rev LTM | 4.4% |
| FCF/Rev 3Y Avg | 3.3% |
Valuation
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| Mkt Cap | 18.6 |
| P/S | 1.0 |
| P/EBIT | 19.1 |
| P/E | 22.4 |
| P/CFO | 12.0 |
| Total Yield | 2.9% |
| Dividend Yield | 0.0% |
| FCF Yield 3Y Avg | 2.3% |
| D/E | 0.3 |
| Net D/E | 0.2 |
Returns
| Median | |
|---|---|
| Name | |
| 1M Rtn | 3.5% |
| 3M Rtn | -3.3% |
| 6M Rtn | -13.4% |
| 12M Rtn | -2.9% |
| 3Y Rtn | 13.8% |
| 1M Excs Rtn | 0.1% |
| 3M Excs Rtn | -8.3% |
| 6M Excs Rtn | -26.7% |
| 12M Excs Rtn | -19.4% |
| 3Y Excs Rtn | -68.3% |
Comparison Analyses
Price Behavior
| Market Price | $10.26 | |
| Market Cap ($ Bil) | 1.0 | |
| First Trading Date | 06/20/2019 | |
| Distance from 52W High | -45.0% | |
| 50 Days | 200 Days | |
| DMA Price | $12.12 | $14.23 |
| DMA Trend | down | down |
| Distance from DMA | -15.4% | -27.9% |
| 3M | 1YR | |
| Volatility | 40.5% | 68.4% |
| Downside Capture | 181.96 | 22.19 |
| Upside Capture | -48.94 | -23.78 |
| Correlation (SPY) | 12.9% | 2.7% |
| 1M | 2M | 3M | 6M | 1Y | 3Y | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Beta | 0.57 | 0.40 | 0.22 | 0.60 | 0.09 | 0.33 |
| Up Beta | -0.45 | -0.88 | -0.44 | 1.22 | 0.48 | 0.55 |
| Down Beta | 1.33 | 0.73 | 1.04 | 0.37 | -0.23 | 0.02 |
| Up Capture | -112% | -84% | -112% | -0% | -22% | 1% |
| Bmk +ve Days | 12 | 25 | 38 | 73 | 141 | 426 |
| Stock +ve Days | 6 | 14 | 25 | 54 | 113 | 373 |
| Down Capture | 175% | 169% | 124% | 83% | 26% | 79% |
| Bmk -ve Days | 7 | 16 | 24 | 52 | 107 | 323 |
| Stock -ve Days | 13 | 27 | 37 | 70 | 133 | 373 |
[1] Upside and downside betas calculated using positive and negative benchmark daily returns respectively
Based On 1-Year Data
| Comparison of GO With Other Asset Classes (Last 1Y) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GO | Sector ETF | Equity | Gold | Commodities | Real Estate | Bitcoin | |
| Annualized Return | -38.2% | 0.7% | 19.2% | 71.9% | 8.9% | 6.0% | -10.4% |
| Annualized Volatility | 68.3% | 13.9% | 19.5% | 19.3% | 15.3% | 17.1% | 35.0% |
| Sharpe Ratio | -0.44 | -0.19 | 0.78 | 2.69 | 0.36 | 0.18 | -0.12 |
| Correlation With Other Assets | 34.3% | 2.6% | 4.7% | 5.3% | 12.2% | 10.5% | |
ETFs used for asset classes: Sector ETF = XLP, Equity = SPY, Gold = GLD, Commodities = DBC, Real Estate = VNQ, and Bitcoin = BTCUSD
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Based On 5-Year Data
| Comparison of GO With Other Asset Classes (Last 5Y) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GO | Sector ETF | Equity | Gold | Commodities | Real Estate | Bitcoin | |
| Annualized Return | -23.3% | 5.8% | 14.9% | 18.7% | 11.7% | 4.8% | 32.6% |
| Annualized Volatility | 46.6% | 13.0% | 17.1% | 15.5% | 18.7% | 18.9% | 48.7% |
| Sharpe Ratio | -0.41 | 0.24 | 0.70 | 0.97 | 0.51 | 0.17 | 0.59 |
| Correlation With Other Assets | 30.1% | 14.6% | 4.6% | 2.0% | 18.8% | 7.0% | |
ETFs used for asset classes: Sector ETF = XLP, Equity = SPY, Gold = GLD, Commodities = DBC, Real Estate = VNQ, and Bitcoin = BTCUSD
Smart multi-asset allocation framework can stack odds in your favor. Learn How
Based On 10-Year Data
| Comparison of GO With Other Asset Classes (Last 10Y) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GO | Sector ETF | Equity | Gold | Commodities | Real Estate | Bitcoin | |
| Annualized Return | -14.6% | 7.1% | 14.7% | 14.9% | 6.9% | 5.2% | 69.2% |
| Annualized Volatility | 45.7% | 14.7% | 18.0% | 14.8% | 17.6% | 20.8% | 55.8% |
| Sharpe Ratio | -0.18 | 0.36 | 0.70 | 0.83 | 0.31 | 0.22 | 0.90 |
| Correlation With Other Assets | 29.7% | 18.9% | 7.9% | 2.8% | 18.8% | 10.5% | |
ETFs used for asset classes: Sector ETF = XLP, Equity = SPY, Gold = GLD, Commodities = DBC, Real Estate = VNQ, and Bitcoin = BTCUSD
Smart multi-asset allocation framework can stack odds in your favor. Learn How
Returns Analyses
Earnings Returns History
Expand for More| Forward Returns | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Date | 1D Returns | 5D Returns | 21D Returns |
| 11/4/2025 | -8.0% | -18.9% | -20.0% |
| 8/5/2025 | 42.7% | 42.1% | 39.2% |
| 5/6/2025 | -6.1% | -16.0% | -15.6% |
| 2/25/2025 | -30.2% | -28.1% | -18.0% |
| 10/30/2024 | -16.3% | -12.3% | 27.9% |
| 8/6/2024 | 5.9% | 3.8% | -8.3% |
| 5/7/2024 | -19.4% | -21.1% | -17.5% |
| 2/27/2024 | -1.2% | 1.1% | 9.6% |
| ... | |||
| SUMMARY STATS | |||
| # Positive | 8 | 10 | 11 |
| # Negative | 17 | 15 | 14 |
| Median Positive | 5.5% | 3.2% | 9.8% |
| Median Negative | -6.1% | -12.3% | -15.8% |
| Max Positive | 42.7% | 42.1% | 39.2% |
| Max Negative | -30.2% | -28.1% | -20.0% |
SEC Filings
Expand for More| Report Date | Filing Date | Filing |
|---|---|---|
| 9302025 | 11052025 | 10-Q 9/27/2025 |
| 6302025 | 8062025 | 10-Q 6/28/2025 |
| 3312025 | 5072025 | 10-Q 3/29/2025 |
| 12312024 | 2262025 | 10-K 12/28/2024 |
| 9302024 | 11062024 | 10-Q 9/28/2024 |
| 6302024 | 8072024 | 10-Q 6/29/2024 |
| 3312024 | 5082024 | 10-Q 3/30/2024 |
| 12312023 | 2282024 | 10-K 12/30/2023 |
| 9302023 | 11082023 | 10-Q 9/30/2023 |
| 6302023 | 8092023 | 10-Q 7/1/2023 |
| 3312023 | 5102023 | 10-Q 4/1/2023 |
| 12312022 | 3012023 | 10-K 12/31/2022 |
| 9302022 | 11092022 | 10-Q 10/1/2022 |
| 6302022 | 8102022 | 10-Q 7/2/2022 |
| 3312022 | 5112022 | 10-Q 4/2/2022 |
| 12312021 | 3022022 | 10-K 1/1/2022 |
External Quote Links
| Y Finance | Barrons |
| TradingView | Morningstar |
| SeekingAlpha | ValueLine |
| Motley Fool | Robinhood |
| CNBC | Etrade |
| MarketWatch | Unusual Whales |
| YCharts | Perplexity Finance |
| FinViz |
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